Natural Resource Damages: Trusting the Trustees by White, Rhoda L.
Comments
Natural Resource Damages: Trusting the
Trustees
[W]hether law should intervene to prevent or to compensate for
harms documented by scientific evidence is clearly a value-laden
question of law and policy. What we decide to call pollutants...
may be partly determined by what harms we think are important,
which harms we think we can control, and which harms we wish to
do something about. . . . From a policy point of view, we should
be interested in carefully weighing the costs and benefits of any
legal intervention to protect the environment as well as the distri-
bution of those costs and benefits . . . . [Or] [plerhaps the issue
is not one of rights or costs and benefits but one concerning the
kind of life we want to live.'
Injury to the environment often remains uncompensated and un-
restored after expenditures are made to clean up sites polluted by a
hazardous substance release or an oil spill. Yet, damages for harm to
public natural resources not addressed by response and remedial ac-
tions following such incidents are recoverable in actions brought by
federal and state trustees against responsible parties. The 1980 Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA or Superfund)2 codifies the cause of action. The stat-
1. T. HOBAN & R. BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE: THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE
COURTS, 24-25 (1987).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-57 (West Supp. 1989), as amended and
reauthorized by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
ute includes a provision which legislatively "created the first federal
and state resources trustees and empowered them to seek damages
for injury caused by toxic wastes to public natural resources. ' Com-
mon law recognized state authority over public resources under con-
structs such as the public trust doctrine and parens patriae. How-
ever, until the 1970s, public natural resources lacked the kind of
legal protection available for private property.4 The 1977 amend-
ments to the Clean Water Act (CWA)5 authorize federal and state
governments to recover "costs or expenses incurred . . . in the resto-
ration of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a result of a
discharge of oil or a hazardous substance."6 CERCLA extends pro-
tection to additional environments. Public trustees, by statute, now
have both a duty and the power to restore public resources damaged
by hazardous substances.
CERCLA mandated the creation of assessment rules for public
trustees to follow in a CERCLA or CWA claim for natural resource
damages remaining after response and cleanup remediation. The De-
partment of Interior (DOI) was charged with the task of devising
the standard procedures. Trustee assessments conducted under the
rules have the "force and effect of a rebuttable presumption." 7 The
regulations issued by DOI in 1986 and 1987 filled a void in the con-
troversial area of damage assessments of public natural resources.
However, the choice of valuation methodology affects the recovery
amount, and therefore the ability to actually restore or replace dam-
aged public resources. Rather than resolving resource valuation con-
flicts, DOI's rules instead served to focus the controversies. The rules
were quickly challenged" as inadequate to achieve CERCLA's in-
tent, that is, full compensation for "injury to, destruction of, or loss
of, natural resources." 9 In July 1989 a federal appeals court ordered
DOI to rewrite the rules to conform to the legislative objective.' 0
CERCLA is retrospective, unlike prior environmental legislation
such as CWA. "Natural resources" are broadly defined under CER-
3. Anderson, Natural Resources Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16
ENVTL. AFF. 405, 406 (1989).
4. "While large scale destruction of [natural resources] . . . is not new, the idea
that states can or should seek to recover compensatory damages for their destruction
seems quite recent." Halter & Thomas, Recovery of Damages by States for Fish and
Wildlife Losses Caused by Pollution, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 5, 6, n.9 (1982).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
6. Id. § 1321(0(4).
7. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1989); Natural Re-
source Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.11 (1987).
8. See infra notes 139-83 and accompanying text, Section Ill.B, "Successful
Challenges," for the court actions and results.
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1989).
10. Ohio v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied
897 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (en banc); Colorado v. United States Dept. of Interior,
880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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CLA. Moreover, CERCLA relaxes liability limitations, standards
for establishing causation, and common law evidentiary barriers,
while expanding the pool of potential responsible parties (PRP's)
who may be held liable for such damages." Virtually anyone associ-
ated with the hazardous substance, its transport or disposal, is poten-
tially liable for both clean-up costs and natural resource damages
caused by the release.'
2
The PRP definition includes state and local governments and ex-
plicitly extends to them the same type and degree of liability it ex-
tends to any other potentially liable person. 3 Public trustee liability
is likely to be upheld in a natural resource damages action. A recent
United States Supreme Court decision' 4 found that Congress in-
tended CERCLA to override a state's immunity from suits brought
by private parties seeking contribution for cleanup costs. The court
gave no indication that the same reasoning would not extend beyond
cleanup costs to the natural resource damages provisions of the stat-
ute as well. Consequently, a state could find itself the investigator
and damage assessor of the public trust and, simultaneously, a viola-
tor liable for portions of the recovery required to compensate the
public for injury to those natural resources.
This Comment reviews the scope of actions for damages to public
natural resources caused by hazardous substances; the need for real-
istic valuation of natural resources to accomplish restoration follow-
ing injury; the inherent difficulties in setting assessment standards;
and the deficiencies in DOI's initial damage assessment rules. The
mandate that public trustees pursue compensation for natural re-
source damages also raises questions about the nature of the public
trust, trustee duties, and trustee liabilities, as well as concerns about
compensation sources, conflicts of interest, and intervention rights of
the public "beneficiaries" of the public natural resources trust.
I. ASSERTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES DAMAGES
A. Scope of Recovery
1. Hazardous Substances and Damages Recovery Authority
CERCLA specifically designates hundreds of chemicals and other
substances as hazardous. Each may give rise to claims under the Act
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West Supp. 1989).
12. Id. § 9607(a).
13. Id. § 9601(21).
14. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
for natural resource damages. 5 Although CERCLA excludes petro-
leum products from its list of hazardous substances, the statute ex-
plicitly incorporates hazardous substances that may be designated
under the CWA.' 6 CWA addresses oil and other hazardous sub-
stance releases into navigable waters, separately defining each cate-
gory,1 7 but authorizing broad damage recoveries for damages from
either release source." The authority to pursue monetary recoveries
in order to restore or replace damaged natural resources is thus ex-
plicit in both CWA and CERCLA.
CERCLA prescribes that the damage assessment rules authorized
by the Act apply to recoveries under either CWA or CERCLA.
Congress thus explicitly manifested its intent that compensation pur-
sued by public trustees be for the "injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources resulting from a release of oil or a hazardous sub-
stance,"' 9 despite CERCLA's apparent exclusion of oil as a hazard-
ous substance for other purposes within its scope. The assessment
rules as issued are also explicit in this regard.20 Congress intended to
merge recovery procedures following incidents covered by either Act
into a uniform set of damage assessment rules."'
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West Supp. 1989). "The definition of 'hazardous
substance' is broadly defined by reference to chemicals designated under other environ-
mental statutes. Approximately 700 chemicals are thus specifically designated as hazard-
ous substances, and chemicals not listed which exhibit specified hazardous characteristics
also qualify as hazardous substances." Breen, Natural Resources Recovery by Federal
Agencies-A Roadmap to Avoid Losing Causes of Action, 13 ENVTL. L, REP. 10,324,
10,324-25 n.10 (1983) [hereinafter Breen, Roadmap].
16. "The term 'hazardous substance' . . . does not include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated
as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph." 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (emphasis added). The "(A)" alluded to is an explicit incorporation
of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) of the CWA into the definition.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1),(14) (1982).
18. Id. § 1321(f)(4)&(5) (i.e., "any costs or expenses incurred by the Federal
Government or any State government in the restoration or replacement of natural re-
sources damaged or destroyed as a result of a discharge of oil or hazardous substances
19. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9651(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
20. "[CERCLA] . . . and. . . [CWA] . . . provide that natural resource trustees
may assess damages to natural resources resulting from a discharge of oil or a release of
hazardous substance covered under CERCLA or the CWA and may seek to recover
those damages." Regulations Respecting Assessment of Damages to Natural Resources,
43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (1987). DOI rules promulgated pursuant to the requirements of CER-
CLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9651(c)(2) (1983 & West Supp. 1989).
21. Congressional authorization for recoveries of damages "beyond the mere re-
moval or remedying of spills" was judicially validated as including those from oil. Ohio v.
United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 439, 432 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d
1151 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (en banc). CERCLA mandates that the procedures govern actions
brought by federal and state trustees under both CERCLA and the CWA. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9607(f)(2) (West Supp. 1989). "Congress conferred on the President (who in turn
delegated to Interior) the responsibility for promulgating regulations governing the as-
sessment of damages for natural resource injuries resulting from releases of hazardous
substances or oil, for the purposes of CERCLA and the Clean Water Act's § 311 (f)(4)-
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2. "Natural Resources"
CERCLA defines natural resources as "land, fish, wildlife, biota,
air, water . . . and other such resources belonging to, managed by,
held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the
United States . . .any State or local government."22 The expansive
definition of the natural world is circumscribed for liability purposes
by the requirement of a government connection to the resources
("belonging to, managed by, held in trust by . . ... "). The govern-
ment connection is cast in fiduciary terms: the government is respon-
sible to the public for stewardship of the natural resources trust.
Moreover, the government alone is authorized to bring a cause of
action to recover for damages to public resources.23
Commentators differ in their assessments of how far the definition
of natural resources extends for purposes of damages recovery. Some
writers insist that the government connection to the injured resource
must be tantamount to ownership control.2" Others assert that the
scope includes any resource regulated by government.2 5 Still others
(5) oil and hazardous substance natural resource damages provisions. 33 U.S.C. §
1321(f)(4)-(5)." Ohio, 880 F.2d at 439.
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(16) (West Supp. 1989).
23. "The President, or the authorized representative of any State, shall act on be-
half of the public as trustee of such natural resources to recover for such damages." 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607 (f) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). "[A]ny such claim [for injury
to, or destruction or loss of natural resources] may be asserted only by the President, as
trustee for natural resources ... or by any State for natural resources within the bound-
ary of that State belonging to, managed by, controlled by or appertaining to the State
...." Id. § 961 1(b)(1) (emphasis added). Congress also excluded purely private prop-
erty from the scope of compensation in the final Superfund (CERCLA) program. Id. §
9607(0.
24. These commentators argue for a narrow construction of the necessary govern-
ment connection: "[T]he natural resources provisions must be limited to government-
owned resources, other resources where the government virtually has outright ownership,
or resources where government control amounts essentially to ownership control." War-
ren & Zackrison, Natural Resources Damages Provisions of CERCLA, 1 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1985, at 18, 21. Under this construction, government's control
over the resources would have to be "so pervasive or formal as to be tantamount to an
ownership interest" before damages recovery could be pursued under the statute. Id.
25. These commentators view the nexus requirement less restrictively and would
include: (a) Resources owned by government, (b) resources belonging to the public trust,
(c) resources regulated by government for environmental purposes, and (d) "resources
that are NOT directly regulated by a government for purposes of environmental protection
but that could constitutionally be regulated." Breen, CERCLA's Natural Resource
Damage Provisions: What Do We Know So Far?, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10304, 10305
(1984) [hereinafter Breen, What Do We Know?]. The last of these connections has the
least nexus to the government and may therefore fall outside the damage recovery scope:
"Whether damage to resources in [category (d)] is recoverable will probably have to
await judicial interpretation, further legislative elaboration, or at least regulatory defini-
construe the language so broadly as to include all natural resources
within a state's jurisdiction, regardless of public ownership or regula-
tory connection.26
The DOI interpretation of the requisite government connection to
natural resources is unclear. Although DOI used the same language
as the statute, comments accompanying its damage assessment rules
introduced ambiguity about how narrowly the agency was actually
construing the nexus requirement. If the agency intends to restrict
recoveries for natural resource damage to only those resources in
which a governmental entity holds title, then "it would pose a serious
risk of running afoul of CERCLA. ' '2 7 DOI is under court order to
clarify its interpretation of its own regulations "insofar as they may
extend to lands not owned by the government."2 In the meantime,
no bright line test circumscribes the resources that fall within the
recovery range.
B. Liability
However the resource scope is construed, damages from the re-
lease of hazardous substances for "injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such
injury, destruction, or loss ''29 are a potentially enormous financial li-
ability.30 Unless the parties subject to liability can demonstrate that
the specific damages were "formally identified and pre-authorized,
tion." Id.
26. Under this interpretation, the language "within the State or ... appertaining
to the State" expands upon "mere sovereignty" to reach all resources within the govern-
ment's jurisdiction. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation: Natural Re-
sources Damages, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1565, 1566-67 (1986). The emphasis is thus placed
on the natural resources themselves. The assertion is that the distinction between private
and public ownership is inconsistent with "CERCLA's goal of forcing defendants to in-
ternalize the social costs of natural resource damage, because all natural resources may
provide services to, and be valued by, the public," although the legal distinction between
public and private damages should be retained. Id. at 1567. Supporters of this view also
argue that "on its face [the statute] goes beyond mere ownership or control. For exam-
ple, the word 'trust' indicates that this definition should include not only resources owned
or possessed by the government, but also resources in the 'public trust,' such as navigable
waters, wetlands, and parklands" regardless of public control. Id. at 1566 n.12. This
construction is probably too broad, as Congress apparently intended to draw some dis-
tinction between public and purely private resource holdings by including the government
nexus element.
27. Ohio v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 461 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g
denied, 897 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (en banc).
28. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1989). "'Damages' means the
amount of money sought by the Federal or State agency acting as trustee as compensa-
tion for injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources as set forth in section 107(a) or
111(b) of CERCLA." 42 C.F.R. § 11.14(1) (1987).
30. For example, in United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo.
1985), the United States sought up to $1.8 billion for natural resources damages at the
Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado.
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"[tihe President, or the authorized representative of any State, shall
act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources to
recover for such damages." 31
The parties responsible for response and clean-up costs are also
liable for natural resources damages. CERCLA provides few de-
fenses, and makes "virtually everyone connected with the unsafe dis-
posal of hazardous substances . . . liable"32: present and past owners
or operators of a vessel or facility from which hazardous substances
were released; transporters of such substances; and persons who ar-
ranged for disposal, treatment, or transport of such substance.
33
"Person" is very broadly defined to include not only individuals
and numerous private entities, but also the United States, states, and
municipal governments.34 Unless a state or local government invol-
untarily acquired control or ownership of an offending facility or ves-
sel, 35 it is subject to all the liabilities and provisions of the legislation
"in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity. '36 This specifically in-
cludes liability under the section relating to natural resource dam-
ages.3 7 The exclusion based on involuntary acquisition of the hazard-
ous substances or offending circumstance does not apply if the
governmental entity caused or contributed to the release.38 These
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
[N]o liability to the United States or State ... shall be imposed under...
this section, where the party sought to be charged has demonstrated that the
damages to natural resources complained of were specifically identified as an
irreversible and irretrievable commitment of natural resources in an environ-
mental impact statement, or other comparable environment analysis, and the
decision to grant a permit or license authorizes such commitment of natural
resources, and the facility or project was otherwise operating within the terms
of its permit or license ....
Id. The bar to liability for damages to natural resources previously committed to a per-
mitted activity is absolute; the liability exclusion for damages "attributable to federally
permitted releases may be recovered, if at all, only under existing law and not pursuant
to CERCLA." Warren & Zackrison, supra note 24, at 21.
32. Breen, Roadmap, supra note 15, at 10,324. Defenses are limited to acts of
God, acts of war, and certain third party defenses. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West
Supp.1989).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1989).
34. Id. § 9601(21).
35. Sources of involuntary acquisitions include bankruptcy, tax delinquency, aban-
donment or similar circumstances associated with the government's function as sovereign.
Id. § 9601(20d).
36. Id. § 9601(20d).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 9607(d)(2). Even in emergency response, costs or damages may still be
assessable to State or local government if they occurred as a result of gross negligence or
intentional misconduct by the State or local government.
stipulations suggest that conflicting duties to the public could con-
front the trustees with some frequency. The very government acting
under an imperative to recover damages on behalf of the public
could find itself simultaneously obligated to apportion liability to
itself.
Although CERCLA does not expressly mention either strict or
joint and several liability, courts have inferred both from the Act's
legislative history.3 9 The legislation was intended to break with tradi-
tional common law insofar as the latter inhibits recoveries. Larger
awards are possible due to CERCLA's (and CWA's) restoration em-
phasis and to the enactment of "provisions that impose liability be-
yond that required by common law and remove barriers to liability
that would conventionally be available. ' 40 Congress conferred au-
thority on the court to resolve contribution claims and to allocate
response costs among liable parties "using such equitable factors as
the court determines are appropriate. ' 41 Congress apparently in-
39. See generally Garber, Federal Common Law of Contribution under the 1986
CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365 (1987).
40. Anderson, supra note 3, at 427. Common law rights and remedies are pre-
served under CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9614(a)), but actions under the statute carry differ-
ent implications:
The liability provisions of CERCLA constitute a legislative scheme that sub-
stantially departs from common law in the area of hazardous wastes. Liability
under CERCLA does not depend on the principles of nuisance, negligence, and
trespass traditionally used in pollution tort cases .... Instead, parties are lia-
ble for the costs of cleaning up hazardous substances simply on the basis of
their relationship either to the site contaminated ... or to the hazardous sub-
stances themselves, regardless of fault.
Garber, supra note 39, at 367 (footnote omitted).
One commentator identified five distinctions separating the application of strict liabil-
ity under a statute like CERCLA and under the common law. Anderson, supra note 3, at
47-31. (1) The statute specifies what wastes are hazardous and provides no excuses based
on social utility for responsible parties to use as defenses. Congress' pre-incident balanc-
ing of injury against the importance of an activity causing the injury substitutes for
traditional judicial discretion over such balancing. (2) In its "preventative and precau-
tionary" standards, CERCLA dispenses with plaintiff's common-law burden of proving
"injury or irreparable harm of a substantial nature." (3) CERCLA requires only that the
PRP be "in the class of persons identified by the statute" and that the PRP's waste be
present at the site. Anderson construed the proximate cause requirement of the injury to
be eliminated by CERCLA. But the statutory language is ambiguous. See Ohio court's
interpretation infra note 158. (4) The defenses under the statute include neither the com-
mon law contributory negligence nor assumption of risk defenses. (5) CERCLA imposes
a financial liability limit, albeit a high one, on damage recoveries for natural resource
injuries. Anderson, supra note 3, at 427-31.
The joint and several liability question was litigated repeatedly, particularly prior to
the explicit contribution sections added by SARA in 1986. The conclusions were that it
may be imposed on responsible parties, as noted by the court in Colorado v. Asarco, Inc.,
608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1985), which reviewed several other holdings to that
effect. The Asarco court's interpretation is supported by the broad remedial intent be-
hind CERCLA.
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(a) (West Supp. 1989). Superfund has been character-
ized as "a federal bill collectors' statute, identifying such a broad group of debtors that
Congress may have reached the limit of the constitutionally required rational nexus that
414
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tended that parties responsible for spills or releases, irrespective of
their identities, provide complete remediation and full compensation
for harms caused to public natural resources by their activities.42
Federal or state agencies are aided in damage recovery efforts by the
rebuttable presumption attaching to trustee assessments when they
are conducted according to the regulations promulgated by DOI.
43
How such a presumption operates if the government, represented by
the agency, is also a PRP is unclear and remains untested.
C. Authorized Uses of Recovered Damages
Recovered damages under incident-specific plans developed and
adopted by the trustee may be used "only to restore, replace, or ac-
quire the equivalent of" the injured or destroyed natural resources.
44
Statutory language governing legitimate uses of money recovered in
a natural resource damages action should be read together with con-
gressional emphasis on restoring injured resources. Such a reading
"makes it obvious that . . . the measure of damages must not only
be sufficient to cover the intended restoration or replacement uses in
the usual case but may in some cases exceed restoration cost by in-
corporating interim lost use value as well."145 The portion of recov-
eries in excess of the cost to restore damaged sites are intended for
use in acquiring new resources.
The effectiveness of restoration or replacement depends upon the
amount of damages recovered. In turn, this amount depends upon
the methodologies used to calculate the loss. Complexity and contro-
must exist between the objectives of legislation and the scheme adopted to achieve
them." Anderson, supra note 3, at 440-41. See generally Glass, Superfund and SARA:
Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 385 (1988).
42. Damages may now be sought only against responsible parties, although CER-
CLA allowed claims against the federal Superfund prior to the 1986 amendments.
"SARA cut off the availability of Superfund money for natural resource restoration in
1986, but the statutory provisions governing Superfund remain on the books and provide
evidence of Congress' intent to require responsible parties to pay restoration costs." Ohio
v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 448, 445 n.1 1 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reh'g
denied, 897 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (en banc).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1989); 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(ff)
(1987).
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f) (West Supp. 1989). Similarly, CWA provides that
"Sums recovered shall be used to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of such
natural resources by the appropriate agencies of the Federal Government, or the State
government." 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (f)(5) (1982).
45. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 448. "The legislative history makes it clear that amounts
recovered in excess of restoration costs are to be spent on acquiring equivalent re-
sources." Id. at n.16.
versy surround this phase of the action. Congress recognized the
trustees' need for a comprehensive system for pursuing recoveries,
despite the inherent difficulties of reaching consensus on even the
most basic questions. Any recovery scheme must make critical un-
derlying assumptions about legitimately compensable values of par-
ticular natural resources. Then, the types and degrees of loss when
natural resources are injured or destroyed must be measured accord-
ing to rational processes.
II. VALUES AND VALUATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
The values legally attributable to public natural resources are un-
settled. Consequently, the appropriate remedy is unclear when re-
sources are injured or destroyed by hazardous substances. "The long
awaited promulgation of the Department of the Interior regulations
.. . [did not] quiet the controversy. "46 Underlying challenge to
those rules is concern over the proper compensable values and the
proper methodologies to quantify lost value in monetary terms. The
DOI rules and their deficiencies exist against a backdrop of compet-
ing philosophies and economic valuation schemes.
A. Natural Resources Values
Deciding what has actually been lost when natural resources are
injured or destroyed is an obvious prerequisite to awarding redress
through monetary damages. People may be able to list values they
intuitively consider important. Yet such constructs, even if legiti-
mate, often outstrip the analytical tools available to convert them
into working methodologies for quantifying losses in monetary terms.
For example, historical value, therapeutic value, genetic diversity
value, cultural value, and spiritual value arguably all have great so-
cial worth. Nevertheless, these values probably fall outside any legal
scheme for compensation when they attach to publicly held prop-
erty.417 Even when the legislature incorporates value concepts into the
law, they can remain quite vague:
Congress has offered little guidance in evaluating the types of value that are
compensable. In the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1980 [for exam-
ple], Congress declared only that "[f]ish and wildlife are of ecological, edu-
cational, aesthetic, cultural, recreational, economic, and scientific value to
the Nation." Yet this listing of value types obscures the most crucial ques-
tions. Surely wildlife has ecological value, but what does that mean? Does
Congress intend to protect wildlife's ecological value to human beings, to
46. Cross, Natural Resources Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REv. 269, 324
(1989).
47. Idiosyncratic value is sometimes recognized by courts granting recoveries for
private property damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(l)(a) and comment
b (1979).
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other wildlife, or to the ecosystem as a whole? What does economic value
mean?48
One approach to the analysis of natural resource values divides them
into three distinguishable types: use value, existence value, and in-
trinsic value.49 The reliability of measurement techniques varies
among the groups. Nonetheless, quantification difficulties ought not
to obscure the legitimacy of the values themselves.
50
First, "use value" equates the worth of natural resources with the
uses people make of them. Some uses are consumptive, such as ex-
traction of minerals, hunting, or fishing. Some uses are nonconsump-
tive, such as bird-watching, scuba diving, or camping. Actual human
behavior provides the evidence for use valuations: "use value for
public resources approximates market value for private resources,
which is the standard measure of damages in our capitalist sys-
tem.""' Courts have traditionally relied on uses made of natural re-
sources to calculate damages, as in awarding the market value of the
timber lost in a destroyed forest or the cost to replace fish in a con-
taminated hatchery. Consistent with this approach, DOI translated
use values into levels of service provided by a natural resource. Re-
covery under the rules is predicated on measurement of the decrease
in services after an injury. 2 The trustee would thus be seeking re-
covery of "lost economic rents from resources it controls. . . . [Such
rents] are measured by the money value of the extra effort [needed]
. . . to receive the same [service] . . . at a substitute, 'next best,'
[site] .-53
Demonstrably, however, natural resources have value beyond the
direct uses people make of them or the economic profit they may
generate. Legislation to preserve wilderness areas or to protect en-
dangered species testifies to such consideration. The second term,
"existence value," encompasses the nonuse importance people place
48. Cross, supra note 46, at 280 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 280-81.
50. Legal recognition of the values to be protected and liability for compensation
when the resources to which they attach are injured may well spur economists to further
refine techniques for quantifying loss.
51. Cross, supra note 46, at 281.
52. The quantification of injury phase in a damages assessment under the DOI
rules has as its purpose "to establish the extent of the injury to the resource in terms of
loss of services that the injured resource would have provided had the discharge or re-
lease not occurred . . . [T]he Quantification phase include[s] methods for establishing
baseline conditions, estimating recovery periods, and measuring the degree of service re-
duction stemming from an injury to a natural resource." 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(e)(2) (1987)
(emphasis added).
53. Anderson, supra note 3, at 445.
on natural resources. This value prevents economic or exchange-
based considerations from resulting in scenarios such as "selling the
Grand Canyon to the highest bidder for commercial development, if
that sale would yield the most profit." 4 Existence value is linked to
peoples' expectations and future options: people may desire to visit a
national park, but may postpone doing so for years while still valuing
their future ability to do so; people may benefit from medical ad-
vances dependent on the preservation of organisms whose utility is
currently unknown.55 People often manifest belief in existence value
vicariously, for example through membership in environmental
groups even though the individual supporters may never experience
any direct benefit from the preservation of the whale or a redwood
forest.56
The existence of natural resources also has a "bequest value" facet
as manifested in the importance one generation places on preserving
unspoiled natural resources for the benefit and enjoyment of future
generations. 57 Arguably, the presence of natural resources, even un-
used, has value to humans significant enough to be cognizable at
law. The nation's practical and psychological well-being is enhanced
by the existence of natural resources in a condition and in quantities
sufficient to perpetuate their current levels of variety and abundance.
Use value or existence value, or even both together, do not account
for a third type of loss sustained when natural resources are de-
stroyed. "Intrinsic value" refers to the "inherent worth possessed by
natural objects" 58 by virtue of their status as natural creatures or
objects, independent of human uses made of them or even of human
existence. Advocates of this concept 59 reject the anthropocentric as-
sertion that the value of things depends exclusively upon their contri-
bution to furthering human interests.60 However, no reliable method-
54. Cross, supra note 46, at 285. However, such propositions have appeal to some
economists: "Milton Friedman proposed closing the national parks in which the commer-
cial value of lumber or minerals exceeded the value of recreational use." Anderson, supra
note 3, at 445 (footnote omitted).
55. See generally Cross, supra note 46; Anderson, supra note 3.
56. An analogy may be drawn to the vicarious value people place on the existence
of constitutional rights for criminals, although they may not experience the benefits per-
sonally. Cross, supra note 46, at 287-88.
57. Id. at 285-91. This value is too often overlooked: "And what of future genera-
tions of potential users? Economists often avoid worrying about these users. They dis-
count the resource value to present value, which tends to reduce to insignificance the
importance of the next generation's concerns. Some of the assumptions underlying this
technique can be questionable when valuing natural resources damages." Yang, Valuing
Natural Resource Damages: Economics for CERCLA Lawyers, 14 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,311, 10,313 (1984) (footnote omitted).
58. Cross, supra note 46, at 292.
59. Id. at 293. The deep ecology movement is one manifestation of respect for this
value.
60. "The thought that nature might possess its own inherent value is both recur-
rent [in historical and contemporary philosophical thought] and powerful, and is re-
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ology is available for gauging and incorporating an intangible value
such as intrinsic worth into damages assessments. Moreover, the con-
cept itself is controversial as a compensable factor in calculating nat-
ural resource damages.6 Monetizing such losses is certainly prob-
lematic. Nevertheless, the actual cost of natural resource damages
caused by polluters seems inadequately compensated under the ster-
ile formula posited as the correct approach by some economists:
"The theoretically correct way to assess damage to natural resources
is to measure the decrease in value of the flow of services from the
affected resource to the public." 62
B. Value versus Cost and the Open-Access Resources
Complication
The controversy surrounding compensable natural resource values
carries over to the debate about the proper measure of those values.
When the injured natural resources are public (that is, open-access),
arguably the loss cannot be converted into a rational cost figure as-
sessable to responsible parties. Monetary units can never express the
actual value of the resources, either because of a lack of public con-
sensus or because the lost functions are too complex to be reflected
in any practical valuation methodology.63 Yet failure to place eco-
nomic value on natural resources eliminates the deterrent to future
pollution, reduces protection for ecosystems, and sacrifices the multi-
plicity of social interests in the resources. Polluters benefit from con-
sumption of public resources while incurring no cost to themselves
either for the harms they cause or for their disproportionate deple-
flected in environmental regulation, such as the Endangered Species Act." Id. (footnote
omitted).
61. Studies to probe how widely intrinsic value is credited can yield only subjective
results. Few measurement techniques have been devised to establish empirically the per-
vasiveness of such beliefs or their strength. Furthermore, even those who adhere most
strongly to the notion may consider it undesirable to place monetary value on nature's
intrinsic value. Monetizing the loss implies that it is fully replaceable and that what is
unique has interchangeable counterparts. The effect in the minds of some is a degrada-
tion of the natural world to the equivalent of a marketable commodity. Newlon, Defining
the Appropriate Scope of Superfund Natural Resource Damage Claims: How Great an
Expansion of Liability?, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 197, 207 n.74 (1985). But taken to
its logical extreme, the ethical argument against monetizing natural resource losses
"leaves the law only two options: Economically valuing natural resources at zero or at
infinity." Cross, supra note 46, at 294. Neither option is appropriate: the former creates
incentive to destroy the resources, and the latter would lead to grossly disproportionate
damage assessments.
62. Newlon, supra note 61, at 209 (footnote omitted).
63. Yang, supra note 57, at 10,312.
tion of public holdings. Such a situation illustrates "externalized
cost," a construct characterized by overconsumption and misalloca-
tion of resources. Valuing the resources in monetary terms and hold-
ing polluters accountable serves to internalize the cost of polluting
activities, so that the goods and services provided to society reflect
their true cost.
64
Forcing internalization of costs is one apparent objective of CER-
CLA.6 5 The goal is to ensure "'that those responsible for any dam-
age, environmental harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear the
costs of their actions.' "68 Unless people who destroy natural re-
sources are held accountable financially, the costs are borne by the
public with no impact on the polluter's business activities and no in-
centive on the polluter to control destructive activity. More efficient
allocation of resources should result if the legal system requires pol-
luters "to indemnify the public, via the state" for the damage they
cause.
67
The difficulty courts face in attempting to define and quantify
damages turns in part on the relationship between cost and value. To
an economist:
Cost is the out-of-pocket expense required to produce a good, or in the dam-
ages context, the expenditures required to restore or replace a resource.
Value is a measure of what the change in the resource actually cost society,
measured by the public's willingness to pay for the lost services the re-
source had produced. To the extent that the market price of a resource
reflects all the services the resource produces, cost will be the same as
value. 68
The only empirical evidence of the price at which cost and value
converge in this construct is derived from a transaction between a
seller and a buyer.69 However, the absence of a competitive market
64. Internalization of costs is an economic theory advanced as a means of increas-
ing the overall welfare of society by having goods and services reflect their actual cost,
The process provides incentives for the most efficient and cost-effective operation of a
free-market economy. Sources for discussion of this and related economic theories which
color valuation analyses include: G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONO1Ic ANALYSIS (1970); R. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986); Cala-
bresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960).
65. Yang, supra note 57, at 10,312; Cross, supra note 47, at 271.
66. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) quoted in Cross, supra note
46, at 271.
67. Halter & Thomas, supra note 4, at 7-8. These costs would be reflected in the
price of goods. In the effort to maximize profits, businesses theoretically will minimize
damage to the environment so long as the potential liability for harms caused is made to
exceed the cost of avoiding the harm.
68. Newlon, supra note 61, at 204 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
69. "If you know the market price of a unit of use of a resource, say a day of
fishing in a trout stream, then you can use that cost figure as a measure of its value,
because the two will be equal." Yang, supra note 57, at 10,314. Cost and value diverge,
however, when the cost to replace or restore the resources or the lost services they for-
merly provided is higher than the benchmark standard (i.e., evidence of willingness to
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for many open access resources means that cost (expenditure neces-
sary to return a resource to its original condition or to replace it with
its equivalent) may overstate or understate value. "[F]or pure mar-
ket resources, cost equals value, and for pure open-access resources
there is no correlation between cost and value."'70 For the latter, a
lost resource may have intangible values which even restoration can-
not replace.
Economists consider the willingness of consumers to pay for a good ... or
service as the ultimate measurement of the value of the good. Although
open-access resources are different from normal goods, economists believe
that as long as the public is willing to pay for the services provided by these
resources, the concept of willingness to pay exists and it should serve as a
benchmark in valuing.
71
However, willingness to pay is not measurable for many open-ac-
cess natural resources damaged or destroyed by hazardous sub-
stances. Even if ascertained, reliance on use value alone undervalues
the loss. Moreover, selecting willingness to pay as the benchmark is
fundamentally troublesome in the context of open-access natural re-
sources valuation.72 There is something illogical about using a will-
pay). Economists would view the compensation level exacted to cover the costs of restora-
tion (i.e., "the expenditure necessary to replace the lost resource with an identical one or
to restore it to its original condition", Id. at 10,315) as creating a misallocation of social
resources in that case. Such an award would entail a commitment to expend whatever is
necessary to actually restore or replace the injured resource. On the other hand, the
replacement or restoration value figure is established by an appraisal process-"the mar-
ket payment elsewhere for a resource similar to the one lost." Id. at 10,314. A monetary
award based on an approximation of the market value of the damaged resource in such
cases theoretically avoids the over-compensation to the public of the cost method. The
choice between those two options is made economically so as to select the one which most
closely coincides with the actual value to society, as evidenced by market forces in this
construct, for which compensation is sought.
70. Newlon, supra note 61, at 204.
71. Yang, supra note 57, at 10,314 (footnote omitted). Willingness to pay in the
context of use valuation for non-market goods or services is ascertained by evidence such
as expenditures people make in preparation to use the resource: fees paid; costs incurred
to travel to the resource area; and purchases in preparation for using the resource, such
as fishing poles or binoculars and field guides.
72. The perspectives of buyer and seller are fundamentally different.
[Contingent valuation studies (i.e., opinion surveys)] have reached substan-
tially different results depending on whether individuals were asked about the
price that they would pay for natural resource preservation or the price at
which they would sell the natural resource. Willingness to pay for environmen-
tal commodities is typically much less than the price at which persons would
sell such commodities.
Cross, supra note 46, at 318. A hypothetical out-of-pocket measurement arguably is
much more likely to result in a minimization or outright sacrifice of nonuse values than is
a measurement which allows maximized expression of both use values and quality of life
or option values.
ingness-to-pay standard to gauge the value of something already"owned" by the public and which may be more logically construed
as "sold" to a party responsible for its loss. The willingness-to-pay
appraisal standard seems particularly unsatisfactory in the context of
America's attitude towards its vast resources holdings, in which poli-
ticians and citizens alike claim to have such boundless national
pride. Yet that standard is the public trustees' benchmark for com-
puting compensation under the assessment rules promulgated pursu-
ant to CERCLA's mandate.
C. Measurement and Monetization of Natural Resource Injuries
Market valuation is consistent with common law monetization
principles. Private property damage is traditionally deemed to be the
difference between fair market value before and after an injury. If
destruction is complete, compensation is measured by market value
at the time of destruction. Courts use other valuation methods on a
case-by-case basis when property has no ascertainable market value
or when cost to replace or restore is less disproportionate than loss in
market value. Such methods can extend satisfactorily to valuation of
private natural resources because they, too, are traded in the
marketplace.
73
In contrast, many of the natural resources for which CERCLA
allows recovery are "by definition open-access, ' 4 that is, held in
trust for the benefit of all the people. Often those natural resources
have no commercial value and no functioning market to set a price.
Hence, a disparity results between cost and value, with exacerbated
problems of monetizing damages, because market-oriented economic
principles are inadequate to account for the total value of a loss.
This is the case when the loss involves noncommercial species of fish
and wildlife, ecosystems, habitats, and areas of purely aesthetic and
recreational enjoyment. "The basic difficulty with attempting to
value these open-access resources is that the services and functions
they provide cannot be owned exclusively . . . . Their total value is
the sum of their value to all individual users . . . and potential
users." ' They are not normal goods; the consumption of the re-
source by some does not necessarily subtract from others' consump-
73.
For example, the value of a lake, enclosed by private land, may be inferred
from the sales or rental value of the surrounding land. If the lake becomes
polluted by a hazardous chemical spill and can no longer provide some of its
services, such as swimming and fishing, the owner can sue to seek compensa-
tion for an amount equal to the difference between the pre-spill and post-spill
sales price of the land.
Yang, supra note 57, at 10,312 n.14.
74. Id. at 10,312.
75. Newlon, supra note 61, at 206 (footnotes omitted).
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tion of the same good.
7 6
"[T] he economic tools for valuing nonmarket goods are still in the
research stage. The result is that judicial valuation of damaged natu-
ral resources has been confusing and, from an economist's perspec-
tive, often erroneous. 7 Nonetheless, some commentators assert that
"any valuation scheme [under CERCLA] ultimately must be tied to
market value or appropriate surrogates." 8 Ostensibly adopting this
view, the DOI rules codified two standard approaches for calculating
damages: (1) measurement of diminution of use value and (2) resto-
ration or replacement cost.7 9 The measurement of diminution of use
was intended to recover just enough to compensate for lost services.
The measurement of restoration or replacement cost was intended to
recover the lost services at the damaged site or their equivalent
elsewhere.80
1. Diminution of Use Valuation
Loss of use value is reflected in a reduction of recreational or other
public use of an affected area. The lost value may be measured "by
76. Yang, supra note 57, at 10,312.
77. Id. (footnote omitted).
78. Warren & Zackrison, supra note 24, at 49.
79. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(b)(2) (1988).
80. Some courts had adopted such a market or use value approach to natural re-
source injury before the assessment rules were issued, viewing the approach, like DOI, as
consistent with CERCLA intent. For example, in Idaho v. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. 665
(D. Idaho 1986), the state brought suit against the present and former owners of a mine
under both CERCLA and common law for natural resource damages caused by mining
waste. The Bunker Hill court relied on comments from the Congressional Record by
Senator Simpson as illustrative of congressional intent: "The senator recognized both
measures of recovery proposed by the defendant and the plaintiff. Damages to the natu-
ral resources may be calculated on a value basis and on a cost-of-restoration basis. The
calculation which provides the least recovery in terms of dollars is the appropriate mea-
sure of damages." Id. at 676 (emphasis added). Senator Simpson's actual comments
were:
"I also trust that the traditional legal rules for calculating of damages for in-
jury in tort will be observed as part of cost effectiveness. For example, the law
achieves cost effectiveness by awarding the difference in value before and after
the injury, and where the injured interest can be restored to its original condi-
tion for less than the difference in value, the cost or [sic] restoration is used."
Breen, What Do We Know?, supra note 25, at 10,307 (quoting 126 Cong. Rec. S15008
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)). However, it has been observed that although Senator Simp-
son ultimately voted for CERCLA, he was not a proponent of the legislation and his
comments should not carry significant weight as indicative of congressional intent. "The
Supreme Court has noted, '[W]e have often cautioned against the danger, when inter-
preting a statute, of reliance upon the view of its legislative opponents.'" Id. at 10,308
(quoting NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964)).
changes in consumer surplus 8 any fees or other payments collect-
able by the government for a private party's use of the natural re-
source."" 2 If the lost resource is marketed, the diminution in market
price of the resource provides the damages estimate.8 3
Unit valuation is one technique for assessing loss of use damages.
It is a common method for valuing fish kills, for example, and is well
suited to situations where procurement of replacement hatchery
stock is contemplated.8 4 The method operates by pre-assigning dollar
values per unit according to a "willingness to pay" standard, then
multiplying cost per unit by the estimated number of units lost.8 6
Theoretically, such valuation tables could be devised for any com-
mercially obtainable species. However, the unit value approach is in-
herently defective if used as a means of accounting for environmen-
tal losses: it depends upon accurate counts of the affected resource
for full compensation; it is limited to resources that are commercially
exploited (most wildlife falls outside this scheme); it fails to compre-
hend the damage to the entire ecosystem resulting from the injury or
destruction of the counted resource; and it ignores any existence or
aesthetic values of the resource.8 6
Moreover, such tabulations are inflexible. Their application may
skew results when a harvested market value is applied to un-
harvested losses, as when commercial fishery prices are superimposed
on fish which are not stocked 7 or when the value of a caged song-
bird is attributed to a meadowlark. The technique applies actual
price equivalences if the resource is traded, or surrogate prices if
comparable commodities are traded. In the public resource arena,
this approach is troublesome: "For example, values for the fish, shell
fish, plants, and coral in a live reef cannot be reflected adequately in
the prices charged for them by laboratory suppliers or shell and curi-
81. "[C]onsumer's surplus is the difference between the price that consumers pay
for the goods and services they purchase and the value to them of those goods and ser-
vices ... [It is] 'a measure of net benefits-benefits above costs paid-received by an
individual from some good or service purchased.'" Halter & Thomas, supra note 4, at 25
n.105 (citation omitted).
82. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(b) (1988).
83. Id. § 11.83(c).
84. "More than one-third of the states have indicated that they use replacement
cost for determining damages in fish kill cases, and several state legislatures have for-
mally adopted replacement schedules." Halter & Thomas, supra note 4, at 19.
85. For example, if an oil spill is estimated to have destroyed 92 million aquatic
creatures, and if 60 is the replacement value of each destroyed organism, then a damage
award of $5,526,583.20 would result from multiplying the cost per unit times the number
destroyed. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 677 (1st Cir. 1980).
86. Zeller & Burke, Theories of State Recovery under CERCLA for Injuries to
the Environment, 24 NAT. REsOURCES J. 1101, 1112 (1984).
87. See infra notes 103-22 and accompanying text, Section II.C.3, "Replacement
Cost Case Study."
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osity shopowners."8''
Other loss of use methodologies relying on valuation in accordance
with willingness to pay include travel cost8 9 and hedonic pricing
methodologies. 90 The travel cost methodology, to determine the mon-
etary loss from a damaged recreational resource, attempts to set a
willingness-to-pay figure based on the sum of travel expenses, en-
trance fees, and opportunity cost of travel time invested. Data collec-
tion is difficult, and researchers must isolate the diminution of use
attributable to the injury alone by correlating the figure to a set pre-
injury baseline condition. Hedonic price valuation applied to loss of
use measurements is similarly speculative. That technique aims at
capturing "the value of a non-marketed resource as a measurable
component of a marketed resource" 91 based on inferences from pri-
vate market appraisals.92 However, attributing the cause of such
changes is usually very difficult.
Reliance on the actual lost use valuation methodologies as the sole
measure of damages limits full recovery, particularly when use of the
natural resource is strictly construed to include only those uses docu-
mented and committed at the time of injury, as under the DOI rules.
Alternatively, contingent valuation methodologies seek out people's
expressions of value in response to direct inquiry.93 Contingent valu-
ation applies "techniques that set up hypothetical markets to elicit
an individual's economic valuation of a natural resource" 94 to arrive
at a more thorough accounting of the true level of social loss result-
ing from injury to natural resources. These techniques include
surveys of citizens to ask them what monetary value they place on
an identified resource.9 5
88. Anderson, supra note 3, at 443.
89. Le., an individual's incremental travel costs to an area, used as a proxy for the
price of the services of that area, with damages being the measurement of the difference
between the value of the area with and without a discharge or release. See, e.g., Cross,
supra note 46, at 310-12.
90. Le., indirect estimates and analyses of behavior used by implication as a mea-
sure of value, such as estimates of the value of life based on extrapolation from the
amounts people pay to reduce health risks. The technique may be applied in a natural
resources setting to estimate how great a value has been lost by destruction or injury of
the resource through extrapolation from roughly comparable market expenditures. See,
e.g., id. at 313-14.
91. Anderson, supra note 3, at 444.
92. An example might be the change in wage and price differentials as measured
against housing prices in an area where air quality has declined due to pollution. Id.
93. Cross, supra note 46, at 316 n.246.
94. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(i) (1987).
95. A simplistic example would be "How much are you willing to pay for preserv-
ing the remaining grizzlies in Yellowstone National Park?" Cross, supra note 46, at 315.
On the one hand, critics of contingent valuation consider it too
susceptible to distortion by personal bias (such as a strong preserva-
tionist stance), so that the response is not a reliable indicator be-
cause it would not be borne out in actual practice. Also, the credibil-
ity of the results depends on the skill of the interviewer and the
quality of the survey instrument. On the other hand, those results
arguably constitute a more reliable measure of the value of open-
access natural resources than do market data, particularly if the
"willingness to sell" standard is also applied in the survey. Behavior
with respect to commonly held resources may reflect a sense of
powerlessness to affect change, 98 whereas the actual perceived worth
of a resource may emerge when setting a price at which one would
be willing to part with it.
2. Restoration or Replacement Cost
The second standard used to measure damages is restoration or
replacement cost. Restoration entails actual rehabilitation of the
damaged site; replacement costs are those needed to procure substi-
tutes for lost organisms or entire substitute sites. When restoration
cost recovery would be grossly disproportionate to the value lost, it is
generally considered an inappropriate compensatory remedy. How-
ever, the measuring methodology ultimately establishes the reasona-
bleness of restoration costs. For example, a unit valuation methodol-
ogy predicated on market values when applied to a marine
environment damaged by a hazardous substance would create the
phenomenon that "certain marine mammals are valued at zero. Any
restoration efforts would be grossly disproportionate to this mea-
sure." 97 The inadequacy of such a result is evident: "Even where full
restoration cost is not the appropriate measure of natural resources
damage, trustees are entitled to recover something."98
The decision to restore implies the commitment to expend what is
necessary Jto return the injured resource to its pre-injury condition.
That choice eliminates the need to reduce lost use value to suspect
dollar amounts. Even if ecologists and other scientists do not fully
agree on the adequacy of the plan, restoration has the advantage of
providing truly compensatory results which are not produced by dim-
inution in use awards. These results are measureable by "in kind"
comparisons "between the biological character of the resource before
the injury, its scenic value, and the services it rendered, on the one
hand, and the same attributes as provided by the restored resource
96. For example, people may place a high personal value on clean air, yet feel
powerless to change its polluted condition.
97. Cross, supra note 46, at 335 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
98. Breen, What Do We Know?, supra note 25, at 10,310.
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or its replacement, on the other hand." 99
The restoration option will very often result in a higher level of
recovery than the damages calculated by using the loss of use
method within the CERCLA liability limit of $50 million per re-
sponsible party per release or incident, above and beyond response
costs."' 0 Yet balance between cost and benefit need not be ignored,
and a rule of reason is implicit in any judicial determination of dam-
ages. A goal of placing the injured parties as nearly as possible in
the position they would have been in had there been no injury (i.e., a
return to "baseline" in DOI terminology)' 0' has common law prece-
dent. However, the complications in an open-access resource loss sit-
uation are perhaps best illustrated by an analysis of the problems
and issues raised by claims for natural resource damages in Puerto
Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, a case decided just prior to CERCLA's
enactment. 10
2
3. Replacement Cost Case Study
The damage assessment difficulties examined in Colocotroni un-
derlie any attempt to devise rules for restoration or replacement cost
recoveries for open access resources. The case concerns the govern-
ment's obligation to manage natural resources in a manner consis-
tent with the "public trust" concept.'0 3 The case also illustrates the
valuation problems when a damaged site cannot be restored, but
when an analogy to unit value market prices is proposed as the mea-
sure of damages.
The SS Zoe Colocotroni, a tramp oil tanker, ran aground on a reef
off the coast of Puerto Rico in March 1973. In order to lighten and
refloat the vessel, the captain ordered approximately 1.5 million gal-
lons of crude oil dumped into the ocean. The discharge floated into a
bay on a southern peninsula of Puerto Rico. Despite extensive
cleanup activities, the oil caused considerable harm to about twenty
acres of shore including two mangrove swamps along the bay, an
99. Anderson, supra note 3, at 446.
100. The responsible party may be liable for "the total of all costs of response plus
$50,000,000 for any damages under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(1) (West
Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
101. 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (1987).
102. 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
103. Although the opinion preceded enactment of CERCLA, the court was aware
of and alluded to that legislative process and debate in Congress at the time, and the
court's treatment of the "public trust" is not inconsistent with the CERCLA definition.
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 676 n.24.
extensive fish kill, and a significant decline in the number of marine
organisms in the area.10 4 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the
local Environmental Quality Board (EQB) sued in their capacity as
"a governmental entity on behalf of its people for the loss of living
natural resources."' 105 The claim against the ship (in rem), its own-
ers, and its insurers was for injury "broadly conceived" that was
caused to the natural environment by the discharge.1
0
6
The lower court had awarded damages of approximately $5.5 mil-
lion for harm to marine organisms. 01 The figure was calculated us-
ing biological supply house catalog prices."0 8 An additional $559,500
in damages for the destruction of the mango trees resulted in a total
damages award in excess of $6 million (above and beyond uncon-
tested cleanup costs of $78,108). a°9 The statute empowered the EQB
to recover "'the total value of damages caused to the environment
104. Id. at 657-60.
105. Id. at 670-71.
106. Id. at 673. The plaintiffs elected to sue under a local statute, title 12, section
1131(29) of the Puerto Rico Laws authorizing actions to recover for environmental dam-
ages. Id. at 671-72. Puerto Rico, "as owner of the real property primarily affected by the
oil spill ... would, like any private landowner, have a cause of action in admiralty to
recover whatever damages it could prove under conventional principles for its private
economic loss as measured by diminution of market value in the coastal land." Id. at
670 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The choice to sue under a statutory cause of
action, rather than to rely on some implied common law action which the Common-
wealth as trustee might have brought, probably was prompted by the conceded fact that
the damaged land had "no significant commercial or market value." Id. at 673; see also
Grady, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni: State Actions for Dam-
age to Non-Commercial Living Natural Resources, 9 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. Rav. 397,
401, n.21 (1980).
107. Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 662.
108. Biological supply house catalogues set the lowest unit replacement cost at
$0.06 per organism; the court set the damages at a multiple of that unit price using
estimates of the number of organisms destroyed by the spill. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe
Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1344-45 (D.P.R. 1978), affd, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
"We recognize that no market value, in the sense of loss of market profits, can
be ascribed to the biological components of the Bahia Sucia [the bay's] ecosys-
tem. The Court will thus refer to market cost as the most reliable evidence of
the quantum of damages actually sustained, i.e. what is required to make the
Plaintiffs whole. This will comprise the cost of restoring the affected areas to
the condition in which they were before the occurrences." Thus, with little dis-
cussion, the district court awarded plaintiffs the cost of replacing the damaged
marine organisms and mangrove trees.
Grady, supra note 106, at 416 (quoting Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp.
at 1344-45 n.42 (emphasis added)).
109. Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 663. One commentator cites this result as an exam-
ple of why it is important to "distinguish between the market value of resources in the
wild and the market value of the 'harvested' good. . . . Many resources are sold in their
'harvested' [value-added] state but have no commercial value in the wild at all". He
cautions courts against using the price of the "harvested" good as a surrogate for use
value, citing as "a particularly absurd example" the formula used by the district court in
Colocotroni with its "unreasonable results". Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Liti-
gation: Natural Resources Damages, supra note 26, at 1572.
[VOL. 27: 407. 1990] Natural Resource Damages
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and/or natural resources'" in actions brought for violation of the
anti-pollution provisions. 10
The court of appeals held that the statutory language did not re-
strict the state to ordinary market damages,"' concluding that
''strict application of the diminution in value rule would deny the
state any right to recover meaningful damages for harm to such ar-
eas, and would frustrate appropriate measures to restore or rehabili-
tate the environment."". 2 The court adopted a standard for setting
damages in such cases, "borrowing from the suggestion provided by
federal legislation"" -3 that "it is desirable to provide for environmen-
tal damages apart from commercial loss, ordinarily measured by a
market value yardstick.""' 4 The court ordered recovery set at "the
cost reasonably to be incurred by the sovereign or its designated
agency to restore or rehabilitate the environment in the affected area
to is [sic] pre-existing condition, or as close thereto as is feasible
without grossly disproportionate expenditures."
'"15
110. Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 673 (title 12, section 1131(29) of the Puerto Rico
Laws (emphasis added)).
111. The court recognized, "Many unspoiled natural areas of considerable ecologi-
cal value have little or no commercial or market value," and, to the extent that such
areas may have commercial value, "it is logical to assume they will not long remain
unspoiled, absent some governmental or philanthropic protection." Id. at 673. Such a
theory is predicated on the internalization of costs construct. The court reports the testi-
mony of a natural resources economist witness for plaintiffs to rationalize the replace-
ment cost figure awarded by the lower court. Id. at 660.
112. Id. at 673. The court found support for its conclusion that compensation for
the destruction of natural resources may result in an award of damages in excess of the
lost market value of the affected real estate by aligning Puerto Rico's environmental
legislation with evidence of the intent of similar federal environmental legislation. The
court referred specifically to the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977; the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978; the Submerged Lands Act; and the
CERCLA legislation which was pending in Congress at the time. Id. at 673-74, 676
n.24. "Puerto Rico obviously meant to sanction the difficult, but perhaps not impossible,
task of putting a price tag on resources whose value cannot always be measured by the
rules of the market place." Id. at 674.
113. In particular, the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977 significantly ex-
panded the scope of responsible party liability: the federal government and the states
were authorized to recover "costs or expenses incurred . . . in the restoration or replace-
ment of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a result of a discharge of oil or a
hazardous substance." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(4) (Supp. 1989).
114. Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 674.
115. Id. at 675. The Colocotroni court answered the argument that a factfinder
cannot exactly determine the costs reasonably to be incurred for restoration: "Admit-
tedly, such a remedy cannot be calculated with the degree of certainty usually possible
when the issue is, for example, damages on a commercial contract. On the other hand a
district court can surely calculate damages under the forgoing standard with as much or
more certainty and accuracy as a jury determining damages for pain and suffering or
mental anguish." Id.
Two limitations circumscribe the Colocotroni standard: restoration
damages for noncommercial natural resources must not be "grossly
disproportionate" to the harm caused, and the standard is inappro-
priate where actual restoration is not feasible or not contemplated. 116
While affirming the use of restoration costs as the preferred mea-
sure, the court limited the remedy to steps which a "reasonable and
prudent sovereign or agency" would take'1 7 as "component[s] in a
practicable plan for actual restoration."" 8 Granting the remedy
would be inappropriate if literal restoration is impossible: reintroduc-
ing fish into contaminated water where they could not survive, or
replanting mangroves in a swamp too polluted to sustain them,
would be futile gestures.
Similar restrictions appeared in the DOI regulations. However,
DOI injected an additional limitation that virtually ensured that few
restorations could be implemented: if the restoration costs more than
the lost use value, whether or not restoration is feasible, the rules
preclude it as the measure of damages."' In contrast, the Coloco-
troni court remained focused on the fiduciary responsibility of the
state in its role as public trustee: "[T]he Commonwealth must have
the ability to have the corpus of said public trust reimbursed for the
116. Applying its standard to the Colocotroni facts, the court concluded that the
millions awarded as replacement value of the destroyed organisms was error because the
habitat had been rendered unfit to sustain life and because the state did not intend to
actually procure the organisms. Id. at 677.
117. Id. at 675. One commentator criticized the Colocoironi court: "The court
rejected the valuation method on the basis of technical feasibility rather than on the
merit of replacement cost as a valuation method." Yang, supra note 57, at 10,312 n.l 1.
The critic would have preferred that the court acknowledge that "[tihe key to the use of
restoration/replacement value or cost is to look for social decisions ...[such as how
much was recently invested to establish a public park comparable to a destroyed one]
which reflect the value of the damaged resource." Id. at 10,315. This approach, however,
is itself vulnerable to criticism for its market theory bias.
However, as another commentator observed:
The court emphasized the distinction between a practicable plan for actual res-
toration and the use of the alleged replacement value of 92 million invertebrate
animals "as a yardstick for estimating the quantum of harm caused to the
Commonwealth" [Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 677]. The court found that the lat-
ter theory had "no apparent analog in the standards for measuring environ-
mental damages" [Id.]. Although this statement may be true, the concept of
using replacement value as a method of assessing monetary compensation for
injuries to the environment should not be dismissed out of hand. It is difficult to
draw a principled distinction between money compensation to a victim for an
injured part of his body and money compensation to a group of victims for an
injury to their environment.
Zeller & Burke, supra note 86, at 1111-12.
118. Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 677 (emphasis added). "[R]estoration as a theory of
damages assessment in cases involving injuries to the environment [is complicated by]
the difficulty of proving the feasibility of restoration. The feasibility of restoration may
depend to a large degree on the success of a previous cleanup effort which, in turn, may
depend on available scientific technology." Zeller & Burke, supra note 86, at 1107.
119. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text, Section III, "The Public
Trustees' Damage Assessment Rules."
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diminution attributable to the wrongdoers."'"2 The ruling "suggests
trustees may recover the full cost of restoration even when it is sig-
nificantly higher than the apparent diminution in value, so long as
the relationship is reasonable. ' 12 The court's conclusions are consis-
tent with congressional intent in federal environmental legislation to
preserve natural resources. The DOI rules deemphasized that goal,
actually codifying impediments to full damages recoveries.122
III. THE PUBLIC TRUSTEES' DAMAGE ASSESSMENT RULES
Despite the inherent difficulties, government trustees need some
rational scheme for conducting natural resource damage assessments
in order to arrive at fully compensatory and consistent results. CER-
CLA mandated the development of procedures to measure and
quantify the injury caused by a release of hazardous substances. Al-
though trustees are not required to use the codified procedures, as-
sessments conducted under the rules give rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the damages sought are the proper measure of
compensation. 2  Theoretically, such an advantage bolsters the po-
tential for more frequent and more substantial recoveries. DOI was
assigned the task of devising these important rules. 24
A. As Promulgated
The DOI rules apply in two scenarios to direct the procedures for
determining the extent of harm resulting from a hazardous sub-
120. Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 662 n.42.
121. Breen, What Do We Know?, supra note 25, at 10,310.
122. See infra notes 139-87 and accompanying text, Section III.B. "Successful
Challenges."
123. 43 C.F.R. § 11.11 & § 11.14(ff) (1987).
124. "Interior's response to its assigned task of promulgating regulations for as-
sessing natural resource damages was, to put it charitably, relaxed." Ohio v. United
States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 440 (D.C. Cir.), rehg denied, 897 F.2d 1151
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (en banc). The rules appeared three years beyond the due date and five
years after CERCLA was enacted. A DOI director underscored the difficulties the
agency encountered: the problem of reaching consensus on the exact definition of dam-
ages intended by Congress; uncertainty about what criteria to apply in establishing the
required cutoff between a minor spill (to be addressed by Type A assessment procedures)
and a major spill (to be addressed by Type B assessment procedures); uncertainty about
the appropriate threshold for inclusion and exclusion of organisms affected by a spill;
concern regarding the choice of valuation options; and uncertainty about how to account
for subtle or long-term damages less obvious than, for example, waterfowl killed by an oil
slick (e.g., damages to aesthetics or long-term effects of subchronic levels of a chemical
in affected wildlife). Dower, Superfund Sleeper Sends Signals, ENVrL. FORUM, Mar.
1984, at 44-45.
stance discharge. Type A assessment is for "minor" spills, 12 in
which simplified assessments involving minimal field observation are
processed using a computer model 126 with automated value calcula-
tions. 127 Type B assessment is for more extensive releases in which
alternative, individualized protocols apply in three phases: Injury
Determination phase, Quantification phase, and Damage Determina-
tion phase.
128
The purpose of [the Damage Determination phase] is to establish the ap-
propriate compensation expressed as a dollar amount for the injuries estab-
lished in the Injury Determination phase and measured in the Quantifica-
tion phase. . . . [The Damage Determination phase] include[s] guidance
on acceptable economic methodologies for estimating compensation based
on: the costs of restoration or replacement; or a diminution of use value.129
DOI interpreted conservatively the CERCLA damage recovery
provisions. The agency saw no clear congressional intent to deviate
from "common law and economics" as the source of valuation meth-
odologies. 13 0 Consequently, the predominant focus in the Damage
Determination phase was on measuring the lost use value of the in-
jured resources, converted into such "services" to humans as "water
for drinking, the use of fish or wildlife for food, and the use of many
components of the environment for recreation."' 3'1 Yet, the liberali-
zation over common law approaches to liability and defenses evident
in CERCLA suggests that "[i]n particular, the natural resource
damage provisions [aimed to] abandon the conservative common law
approach mandating whatever damage recovery was least costly to
the defendant.' 32 Procedures to achieve CERCLA goals should fa-
cilitate, not restrict, government efforts to obtain full compensation.
Furthermore, the rebuttable presumption accorded to assessments
conducted under the rules supports the contention that Congress ex-
125. 43 C.F.R. § 11.40 (1987).
126. Id. § 11.40-.41. The automated system is the Natural Resource Damage As-
sessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments (NRDAM/CME)
127. The DOI Type A rules (those applicable to minor, point-source discharges in
marine environments) resemble the unit valuation approach in that a dollar value is cal-
culated for each lost organism. For example, a fur seal is valued at $15 based on the
expected price its pelt would fetch. A goose could be valued up to $35 based on the
popularity of hunting. The method is convenient "when the damaged resource provides
consumptive services and can be counted (e.g., number of waterfowl or number of recrea-
tional fish killed by a spill)," or "for valuing damage incidents where a case-by-case
assessment is too expensive." Yang, supra note 58, at 10,313-14.
128. 43 C.F.R. § 11.60 (1987).
129. Id. § 11.13 (e)(3) (emphasis added).
130. DOI argued in defense of the methodologies incorporated into its rules that
"Congress intended that damages under CERCLA would be calculated according to
traditional common-law rules". Ohio v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432,
455 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (en banc). DOI also
emphasized its focus on economic efficiency in the drafting of the rules. Id. at 456.
131. Cross, supra note 46, at 322 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 27,686 (1986)). The rules
codify the functions included under "services" at 43 C.F.R. § 11.71(e) (1987).
132. Anderson, supra note 3, at 450.
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pected government to adopt "regulations that would press well be-
yond traditional damage awards ... [and] facilitate recovery for
difficult-to-quantify, difficult-to-characterize injuries that would not
be compensated under common law."
133
Under the rules, trustees were required to select the least costly
alternative between two types of approved compensation: loss of use
or restoration. 34 That is, the restoration cost measure could be pur-
sued as a remedy only when compensation for lost use at the dam-
aged site would cost more than restoration. Moreover, "restoration
authorization . . . [was] limited to restoring 'services' that have use
value and ignored other values of the damaged natural resources."' 135
The rules prescribed market value as the required monetization prin-
ciple.' 36 Other methodologies which might capture other losses such
as existence value were to be used "only if the authorized official
determine[d] that no use values [could] be determined.' 3 7 Mixed
solutions were precluded, such as combining some lost use with some
restoration or replacement compensation to tailor a remedy to site-
specific circumstances.
In spite of the mandate in CERCLA and the special category of
both the injured property and the authorized plaintiffs under the
Act, DOI's damages recovery focus remained surprisingly tradi-
tional: the least costly alternative to the responsible party designed
for market-construct compensation to the injured party. Opponents
of that approach observed that requiring the trustees to choose on a
"lesser of" cost basis between the loss of human use of the resource
or the cost to restore the resource, coupled with DOI's "hierarchy of
methodologies" for measuring damages, virtually assured the
133. Id.
134. 43 C.F.R. § 11.33 (1987).
135. Cross, supra note 46, at 323. The DOI rules limited the restoration or reha-
bilitation costs option "to those actions that restore or replace the resource services to no
more than their baseline, that is, the without-a-discharge-or-release condition." 43
C.F.R. § 11.81(c) (1987) (emphasis added). Diminution of use value during the restora-
tion or replacement process can be added to a restoration option damages figure. Id. §
11.84(g)(1).
136. "Only when the injured resource is not traded in a market or when that mar-
ket is not reasonably competitive, and no comparable sales are available for use in an
appraisal, may the authorized official use any of the nonmarketed resource methodolo-
gies." Cross, supra note 46, at 322 n.279 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (1986)).
137. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(b)(2) (1987). "Only when the authorized official has deter-
mined that neither the market price nor the appraisal methodology is appropriate shall
... [the alternative] methodologies . . . be used to estimate a diminution of use value
for the purposes [of damage determination]," such as travel cost, hedonic pricing meth-
odologies and unit values. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d) (1987).
"minimiz[ation of] the amount of money available to restore dam-
aged resources, from national parks to endangered wildlife."'
138
B. Successful Challenges
Critics of the DOI rules alleged at the outset that they "under-
state true natural resource damages because of their exclusive focus
on use value and heavy reliance on market valuation," as borne out
by empirical studies.139 For example, Type A damage measurements
are accomplished through a computer model, the Natural Resource
Damages Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments
(NRDAM/CME). NRDAM/CME assigns no value to unused re-
sources. Moreover, the approach "focuses entirely on consumptive
uses,"140 so that "only the destroyed fish that would have been har-
vested are included in the damages assessment. An obvious conse-
quence of this approach is that 'only commercial or recreationally
important species have measurable social value.' Even some recrea-
tional uses of natural resources are valueless under the Department's
present approach" because of the focus on consumptive use. 141 In
addition, no consideration is given to important ecological attributes
of lost natural resources.
On July 14, 1989, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decided two separate but related actions challenging the ade-
quacy of the DOI rules to fulfill the legislative goal of full compensa-
tion to public trustees for despoiled natural resources. The first
opinion, Colorado v. United States Department of Interior,141 ad-
dressed the scope and legality of the Type A damage assessment
rules, incorporating by reference portions of the much longer opin-
ion, Ohio v. United States Department of Interior.14 3 The latter case
interpreted the enabling language in CERCLA, common to both
Type A and Type B incidents. The decisions invalidate certain core
features of the assessment procedures and require DOI to reformu-
late them to conform to Congress' "distinct preference for using res-
toration cost as the measure of damages.' 44
138. Erik Olson, NWF attorney, quoted in 17 Current Developments Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1022 (Oct. 31, 1986).
139. Cross, supra note 46, at 325. See generally id. at 315-20.
140. Id. at 323-24.
141. Id. at 324.
142. 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
143. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
144. Id. at 444.
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1. Colorado v. United States Department of Interior:
Type A Rules Challenge
The state of Colorado and three environmental groups challenged
the scope and content of the Type A rules. These rules apply to as-
sessments of "natural resources damages for discharges or releases
'in coastal and marine environments' """i caused by "minor, short-
duration discharges or releases of oil or hazardous substances."' 46
Assessments of the damages are accomplished using the agency's
"state-of-the-art computer model," NRDAM/CME 47 The com-
puter program contains "general chemical, biological, and economic
information."'1 48 An authorized official enters the incident-specific
data (such as estimated total quantities of discharged or released
substance, the date of discharge, and the boundaries of the affected
area). 49 The automated system then calculates the natural resource
damages which trustees may claim.
Petitioners asserted that the class of releases or discharges to
which the rules apply is "impermissibly narrow."' 150 Although the
court viewed CERCLA's authorizing language as ambiguous, it de-
clined to disturb the scope of the DOI model for Type A damage
assessments. The court concluded that DOI "acted [reasonably and]
within its mandate . . . in limiting its regulatory ambit" in the case
of minor, Type A, releases, 15' after considering DOI's rationale
52
145. Colorado, 880 F.2d at 484.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 488.
148. Id. at 484.
149. Id. at 485.
150. Id. at 486. The rules cover only damages caused by "minor, 'point source'
discharges or releases of short duration, occurring at or near the water surface, in coastal
or marine environments." Id. The limited scope had been almost universally criticized
during the comment period prior to final issuance of the rules, notably by the EPA and
NOAA, with the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) (one of the petitioners in Colo-
rado and Ohio) arguing to DOI that "'by Interior's own estimates about two-thirds or
even four-fifths of the liquid spills, and 80 to 85 percent of the solid releases, occur in
... nonmarine, nonestuarine areas.'" Id.
151. Id. at 489.
152.
DOI has ... stated a sufficient rationale for limiting the scope of its type A
rules as it did. DOI specifically found that data inadequacies and scientific
uncertainty precluded a more ambitious approach to the type A rules: "Coastal
and marine environments were chosen as the subject of the first type A proce-
dure because much more extensive information was available on the fate and
effects of discharges or releases of oil or hazardous substances in these environ-
ments than for other ecosystems and natural resources."
Id. at 488 (citation omitted).
and the agency's intent to incrementally introduce additional seg-
ments as scientific data evolves.
Petitioners' second challenge to the Type A rules coincided with
the damages valuation challenge presented in the action to invalidate
Type B. On that issue, petitioners successfully argued that CER-
CLA mandates that damage calculations favor restoration, and that
the Type A rules are inconsistent with that mandate. The court re-
manded the rules "to permit DOI to develop standard procedures for
simplified assessments of natural resource damages consistent with
relevant portions of our decision in Ohio."'' 3
2. Ohio v. United States Department of Interior: Type B
Rules Challenge
In a consolidated action, ten states, three environmental groups
and others'" petitioned for review of the Type B rules. Type B inci-
dents are more extensive than the "minor" incident types covered by
the Type A regulations and require site-specific evaluations. The
Ohio court invalidated two major provisions in the rules: the so-
called "lesser of" rule and the hierarchy of assessment methods.15
The court held that (1) DOI's provision "that damages for despoil-
ment of natural resources shall be 'the lesser of. restoration or re-
placement costs; or diminution of use values'" is "directly contrary
to the expressed intent of Congress,""' and (2) DOI applied an un-
reasonable interpretation of the statute in its establishment of a
"rigid hierarchy of permissible methods for determining 'use val-
ues.' ",157 The court instructed DOI "to proceed as expeditiously as
153. Id. at 491.
154. Ohio petitioners were three environmental organizations and ten states
("State and Environmental Petitioners"), three "Industry Petitioners," and several inter-
venors representing public interests and industry. 880 F.2d at 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
155. The court applied the two-step statutory interpretation test articulated in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984), to ten issues. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441. Step One requires the court to determine
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. (citing Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 842). If so, then the court (and DOI) "must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The Step One
analysis examines the statutory language in the context of the statute as a whole, If
congressional intent is evident regarding "the precise question at issue, 'that intention is
law and must be given effect.'" Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843). Step Two of the Chevron test applies if "the statute is ambiguous or is silent on a
particular issue." Chevron, 467 at 844-45. If so, then the court will assume the agency
received from Congress the implicit authority to make choices which reasonably accom-
modate conflicting policies. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441. If those agency choices and interpre-
tations are "reasonable" and "consistent with the statutory purpose," then the court must
defer to them. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441.
156. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441.
157. Id. at 462, 464. Recoveries under the hierarchy of methods are limited to the
open market price of the resource or, if there is no competitive market, then to an "ap-
praisal" of market value. Only if neither method is deemed by the trustee to be "appro-
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possible in issuing new regulations" 15a to conform to "the statutory
priate" may other methods of determining use value be employed. Id. at 462.
158. Id. at 481. The court resolved eight issues in favor of DOI:
(1) DOI may retain the requirement to consider only "committed uses" (that is, cur-
rent or planned public uses of the natural resource for which pre-incident commitment
documentation exists) for purposes of quantifying lost services. The focus of damage as-
sessment will be changed to emphasize restoration cost rather than use value, and "proof
of a committed use is not a prerequisite to recovery of restoration costs." Id. at 462.
Therefore, "a trustee is not prohibited from recovering the costs of restoring or replacing
a natural resource, even when that resource has no documented 'committed use.'" Id.
(2) DOI may retain a ten percent discount rate in present calculations of an expected
future injury. Id. at 464-65.
(3) Trustees may delegate the actual natural resource damages assessment to the
PRP's themselves. Congress plainly envisioned a delegation option and DOI provided
reasonable procedures. Safeguards against preferential treatment include the'stipulation
that the responsibility can only be delegated "if an authorized government official calls
on [the PRP] to do so." Id. at 466-67. Moreover, the assessment must follow the meth-
ods outlined in the assessment plan, "drawn up as a coordinated effort among all affected
government trustees, state and federal." Id. at 466. Trustees have the final choice of
methodology and "all actions taken by potentially responsible parties to implement an
Assessment Plan occur under the ultimate approval and authority of the authorized offi-
cial acting as trustee." Id. at 467 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 27,704). The PRP thus functions
"in a strictly ministerial role." Id. at 467.
(4) The court upheld the DOI rule limiting assessment cost reimbursement to an
amount not to exceed "the anticipated damage amount" as based on a rational principle
of waste avoidance, as not inconsistent with statutory purpose. Id. at 468; 43 C.F.R. §
11 .14(ee) (1987). The effect of the rule is to oblige a trustee to absorb that portion of the
assessment costs which may exceed the limitation imposed by the rule.
(5) The court upheld the "acceptance criteria" for determining the causal connection
between a hazardous substance release and the injury to a biological resource (e.g., birds
or fish) for which a trustee seeks damages. The statutory language is ambiguous. The
court viewed the types of biological responses DOI deemed adequate to fulfill the criteria
as strict, but still a reasonable attempt to meet the need for standardized natural re-
source damage assessment. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 472. The court also accepted as reasonable,
albeit "unusually stringent," a requirement that the site-specific evidence to support the
injury claim be corroborated in published scientific literature. Id. at 473. Petitioners
failed to convince the court that the criteria are too burdensome, requiring "virtually
absolute scientific proof of causation" exceeding common law evidentiary requirements,
contrary to "CERCLA's purpose of liberalizing the traditional causation-of-injury stan-
dard." Id. at 469. The court nonetheless drew a distinction between two causation issues
in support of its conclusion: that "between a responsible party and a hazardous substance
release" and that "between a substance release and the biological injuries alleged to have
resulted from it." Id. at 471.
(6) DOI may impose audit procedures that states must adopt for "handling the pro-
ceeds from any natural resource damage claims." Id. at 474. Such standardization is
"entirely consistent" with the CERCLA requirement that state trustees spend such funds
"only on restoration, replacement or acquisition of equivalent resources." Id.
(7) The absence of a punitive damages recovery option is appropriate, all indications
being that Congress intended CERCLA to provide for compensatory damages only. Id.
(8) The court upheld contingent valuation (CV) as an official use valuation methodol-
ogy. Industry petitioners, asserting a single claim in the action, had challenged it as
inconsistent with the "best available procedure" mandate of CERCLA relative to the
rules. The court held that "it is in the mission of CERCLA to assess the public loss." Id.
scheme and . . .CERCLA's decided emphasis on making polluters
pay for restoration of spoiled resources.9
a. "Lesser-of' Rule
DOI required a public trustee claiming natural resource damages
to select the lesser of (1) the diminution of use value resulting from
the hazardous substance incident, or (2) the cost to restore or re-
place the resources to their baseline (pre-injury) condition.'60 The
court framed the "lesser-of" issue narrowly: "[W]hether DOI is en-
titled to treat use value and restoration cost as having equal pre-
sumptive legitimacy as a measure of damages."'' The court held
that DOI is not permitted "to draw the line on an automatic 'which
costs less' basis, ' 62 and so rejected the rule.
DOI's "lesser of' rule rested on two premises: "[F]irst, that the
common-law measure of damages is appropriate in the natural re-
source context, and second that it is economically inefficient to re-
store a resource whose use value is less than the cost of restora-
tion."' 3 The court was persuaded that "Congress soundly rejected"
the two, premises164 after reviewing CERCLA's legislative history
documenting dissatisfaction with common law recoveries 6 " and the
statutory language emphasizing restoration. DOI's "economic effi-
ciency" rational for the "lesser of' rule struck the court as merely a
"cost-benefit" analysis. 66 The court reasoned that "whether a par-
ticular choice is efficient depends on how the various alternatives are
valued.'' 67 Congress undoubtedly intended that "CERCLA's natu-
ral resources provisions . . . operate efficiently."'" 8 However, the
"fatal flaw" in the DOI approach was that "it assumes that natural
at 477. Because contingent valuation measures option and existence values, non-con-
sumptive values compensable under the terms of CERCLA (Id. at 475-76) and factors
Congress intended to consider in the assessment of damages, the court saw nothing "arbi-
trary or irrational about the rebuttable presumption conferred upon . . . [the] methodol-
ogy." Id. at 480.
159. Id. at 449. The court instructed DOI that the agency's "decision to limit the
role of non-consumptive values, such as option and existence values, in the calculation of
use values rests on an erroneous construction of the statute." Id. at 464.
160. 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987).
161. Ohio 880 F.2d at 443. Both petitioners and DOI had presented the issue as
"what measure of damages must be applied in natural resources damages actions." Id. at
442.
162. Id. at 444. "It seems strange. . . that Congress would single out one alterna-
tive measure of damages (restoration costs) and legislate specially to insure that interim
use value damages would be added to it, at the same time it was content to let DOI set
damages at the lowest amount calculable by any acceptable standard." Id. at 448.
163. Id. at 455.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 456.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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resources are fungible goods, just like any other, and that the value
to society generated by a particular resource can be accurately mea-
sured in every case-assumptions that Congress apparently
rejected."'
1 69
Congress did empower DOI to decide "at what point the presump-
tion of restoration falls away. '"170 For example, DOI may decide
when restoration is infeasible or grossly disproportionate in cost com-
pared to value. However, the primacy of restoration as the appropri-
ate remedy may not be supplanted merely because its cost exceeds
(by however little) the diminution in use value of the injured re-
source.17  In addition to its statutory construction conclusions, the
"enormous practical significance of the 'lesser of' rule" impressed
the court.172 The court ruled that DOI had drawn the rules too nar-
rowly. 173 It found "no authorization for DOI to abandon Congress'
strong preference for restoration, clearly expressed in two separate
statutes [CERCLA and CWA] enacted within three years of one
another.' ' 4
169. Id. Congress did not view use value and restoration cost as "having equal
presumptive legitimacy" because of skepticism "of the ability of human beings to mea-
sure the true 'value' of a natural resource .... [N]atural resources have value that is
not readily measured by traditional means." Id. at 457.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 442.
A hypothetical example will illustrate the point: imagine a hazardous substance
spill that kills a rookery of fur seals and destroys a habitat for seabirds at a
sealife reserve. The lost use value of the seals and seabird habitat would be
measured by the market value of the fur seals' pelts (which would be approxi-
mately $15 each) plus the selling price per acre of land comparable in value to
that on which the spoiled bird habitat was located. Even if, as [is] likely, that
use value turns out to be far less than the cost of restoring the rookery and
seabird habitat, it would nonetheless be the only measure of damages eligible
for the presumption of recoverability under the Interior rule.
Id. (footnote omitted).
173. The court also concluded that the "lesser of" rule is inconsistent with the
Clean Water Act (CWA) to which the regulations also apply. DOI contended that "its
'lesser of' rule promulgated under CERCLA trumps the CWA standard." Id. at 450.
The court disagreed. The CWA standard provides "that damages recoverable for releases
of hazardous substances or oil covered by the CWA 'shall include any costs or expenses
incurred by the Federal Government or any State government in the restoration or re-
placement of natural resources damaged or destroyed' . . . . Thus, the CWA expressly
establishes restoration cost as the standard measure of damages." Id.
174. Id. "Such an unequivocal statement of purpose is irreconcilable with DOI's
'lesser of' rule, which would in a majority of cases risk underfunded, half-finished resto-
ration projects." Id. at 454. Moreover, SARA (Superfund reauthorization of 1986) re-
vised the phrasing of the "shall not be limited by" recovery language by splitting it into
three sentences, to clarify Congressional intent that "the primary purpose of the resource
damage provisions of CERCLA is the restoration or replacement of natural resources
b. The Hierarchy of Assessment Methods
The DOI rules established a rigid hierarchy of methods for calcu-
lating lost use values. The rules required measurement by market
valuation unless no competitive market or approximation of one ex-
ists. The Ohio court held that "market prices are not acceptable as
primary measures of the use values of natural resources,"' 17 there-
fore "DOI erred by establishing a 'strong presumption in favor of
market price and appraisal methodologies.' ,1"76 Contrary to that
bias, the court viewed congressional intent to be that the regulations
"capture fully all aspects of loss.' 77 The rules as envisioned by Con-
gress were to provide trustees with a "'choice of acceptable damage
assessment methodologies'" reflecting "'the most accurate and cred-
ible damage assessment methodologies available'"178 so that com-
pensation for injury from hazardous substances is as complete as
possible.
While it is not irrational to look to market price as one factor in determin-
ing the use value of a resource, it is unreasonable to view market price as
the exclusive factor, or even the predominant one. From the bald eagle to
the blue whale to the snail darter, natural resources have values that are not
fully captured by the market system.'1 9
In remanding the rules, the court advised DOI to "consider a rule
that would permit trustees to derive use values for natural resources
by summing up all reliably calculated use values, however measured,
so long as the trustee does not double count."' 80 The court rejected
DOI's "crabbed interpretation" of the statute."8' The court pointed
out that "[o]ption and existence values may represent 'passive' use,
but they nonetheless reflect utility derived by humans from a re-
source, and thus, prima facie, ought to be included in a damage as-
sessment."'18 Although DOI may use reasonable judgment to rank
methodologies as to their relative reliability, "it cannot base its com-
plete exclusion of option and existence values on an incorrect reading
of the statute."'83
damaged by unlawful releases of hazardous substances." Id. at 454 (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 253(IV), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1985)).
175. Id. at 463.
176. Id. (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 27,720 (1986)).
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 85-86 (1980)).
179. Id. at 462-63.
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C. Interim Assumptions
Until DOI rewrites the rules to comply with Ohio, there will be an
interim period without official damage assessment rules in effect. A
similar situation existed during the period of delay between the origi-
nal deadline in 1982 for issuance of the rules and their actual pro-
mulgation in 1986 and 1987. At least one federal court rejected a
defendant's contention at that time that a natural resource damages
action was improper until the assessment procedures mandated by
CERCLA were issued."" Instead, the court held that adequate guid-
ance for damages recovery was to be found in the statute itself and
in existing case law,' 85 referring specifically to the recovery standard
established in Colocotroni.'8 6 Similarly now, at worst, the rebuttable
presumption for trustee assessments may be suspended until DOI re-
issues the rules. Following Ohio, even more guidance for litigating
such claims exists, so no moratorium need be imposed.
The emphasis on the public trust context, within which DOI must
formulate natural resource damage assessment rules, begs the ques-
tion of trustee duty. That context implicates the nature of a govern-
ment trustee's responsibilities to the public and to the natural re-
sources themselves. Even more intriguingly, the statutory provisions
create the probability that trustees themselves may be liable for
damages,117 and that the liability will be measured and apportioned
under the very rules intended for use only by the public trustees
themselves. The potential for conflicts of interest and dilemmas re-
garding satisfaction of judgments thus appears to be inherent in
CERCLA's implementation.
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST CONCEPT IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The statutory language of CERCLA casts the assessment and re-
covery activities of federal and state governments in terms of an ex-
plicit trustee relationship.'88 Yet, the statute does not define "trus-
184. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn.
1982).
185. E.g., Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980).
186. Id. at 1120 n.6.
187. See infra notes 233-80 and accompanying text, Section V, "Trustee Liability
for Public Natural Resource Damages."
188. "[T]he roles of government claimants in resource damage proceedings under
CERCLA are consistent with the common law public trust doctrine, which authorizes a
sovereign to act on behalf of the public to protect natural resources." Menefee, Recovery
for Natural Resource Damages under Superfund: The Role of the Rebuttable Presump-
tion, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 15,057, 15,058 (1982) (footnote omitted). CERCLA directs that
tee." As applied to CERCLA's expansive definition of "natural
resources,"' 189 the role and concept envisioned by Congress may or
may not be co-extensive with the common law public trust
doctrine. 190
The CERCLA requirement that natural resource damages recov-
ered by trustees be used only to "restore, replace, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources"' 91 suggests an analogy "to a
trust of all publicly held natural resources to protect them against
'injury, destruction, or loss' from hazardous substances."' 92 The em-
phasis in the language and legislative history of CERCLA, not the
least of which is the preference for restoration cost as the measure of
damages, supports the contention that the goal is to maintain the
value of publicly held natural resources. In this emphasis, CERCLA
continues the protective thrust of environmental legislation enacted
in the 1960s and 1970s. 93
"the President, or the authorized representative of any State, shall act on behalf of the
public as trustee of such natural resources to recover for such damages." 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(f) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). The DOI rules provide "a procedure by
which a natural resource trustee can determine compensation for injuries to natural re-
sources." 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (1989). "Damages" in the rules are defined as "the amount
of money sought by the natural resource trustee as compensation for injury, destruction,
or loss of natural resources." Id. § 11.14(1).
1S9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(16) (West Supp. 1989).
190. The doctrine enjoyed renewed vitality in the courts during the 1970s and the
statute's legislative period. See generally Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOwA
L. REv. 631, 643-47 (1986).
191. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(0 (West Supp. 1989).
Sums recovered by the United States Government as trustee under this subsec-
tion shall be retained by the trustee, without further appropriation, for use only
to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources. Sums
recovered by a state as trustee under this subsection shall be available for use
only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by
the State.
Id.
192. Newlon, supra note 61, at 219.
193. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 cre-
ated the environmental impact statement process "to force ... [federal agencies] to
become fully aware of the environmental impacts of the action it proposes before it com-
mits itself to them. In this way NEPA's purpose is that avoidable adverse environmental
effects be foreseen and avoided." M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAW 196 (1983).
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the inter-
relationships of all components of the natural environment . . . and recogniz-
ing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental
quality. . . declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government
• ..to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982 & Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). To carry out the policy,
NEPA asserts:
[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all prac-
ticable means . . . to the end that the Nation may (1) fulfill the responsibilities
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The public trust doctrine offers one mechanism for safeguarding
diffuse public interests in natural resources. 94 Three ideas which
have "floated" through American public trust law intersect in the
public trust doctrine and support the theory that special judicial at-
tention is owed to interests in public resources. First, the availability
of certain resources, such as access to navigable waters, is so intrinsi-
cally important that the alienability of those interests would impov-
erish one hallmark of a free society. Second, certain interests in na-
ture's bounty ought to be reserved for the whole populace. The
creation of national parks is one manifestation of that policy. Third,
even where certain uses of resources are granted to private parties,
government retains the right to regulate the use and circumscribe it
for the general benefit of the community.'
95
The development of statutory bases for protection and preserva-
tion of natural resources through damages recovery may affect the
viability of the common law cause of action. Indeed, some commen-
tators advocate abandoning the public trust concept altogether. Yet
it is a persistent construct that has in fact expanded over time,
adapting itself to changing national policies and priorities since its
early, narrow origins. The doctrine has undergone three types of
changes. The first is an expansion of scope, that is, the kinds of re-
sources to which the concept has been applied. The second is a
change in the conceptual basis on which the construct rests. The
of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings; (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses
of the environment without degradation . . .; (4) preserve important historic,
cultural and natural aspects of our national heritage and maintain . . . an en-
vironment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice ....
Id. § 4331(b) (emphasis added).
194. CERCLA and CWA expanded the scope of recovery for natural resources
damages, and states retain authority to legislate even more restrictively than federal ac-
tion if they choose. Yet statutory causes of action tend to narrow judicial discretion in
setting damages. CERCLA does so through its assessment rules: A trustee's measure of
damages due to oil spill or hazardous substance release is presumed to be the proper one
if the assessment is carried out according to the rules, and the balancing of the benefit of
an activity against the harm it causes is to some extent removed from the court and
provided for in advance in the statute. The risk that adequate environmental protection
will not be incorporated into the damages assessment process is illustrated by the recent
experience with the DOI rules remand.
195. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 473, 484-85 (1970). One legitimate role of the courts is
to force examination of the reallocation of public resources from broader to narrower
uses, a change which frequently accompanies the exercise of private property rights
which are contrary to the public interest. Id. at 565.
third is an evolution in the uses made of the doctrine. 190 The incorpo-
ration of trust language into current legislation without elaboration
on the meaning of the term permits the inference that the modern
scope and uses of the public trust doctrine are being codified rather
than abandoned.
A. Scope
The public trust doctrine began in Roman and English law as an
implied property right in navigable waters and certain shores. The
right was deemed to vest in the sovereign as a means of preserving
public benefits such as free navigation for commerce and access for
fishing.'97 That category of public property was "distinguished from
general public property which the sovereign could routinely grant to
private owners."198
An early case, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,9 9 articu-
lated the American manifestation of the common law doctrine. The
Illinois Central court held that the state's express conveyance in fee
simple of submerged lands in Lake Michigan to the railroad was
beyond the power of the legislature. Such a divestment was held to
be an impermissible abdication of the state's regulatory authority
over navigation, a public interest protected by special sovereign obli-
gations.20 ' The Court stated that the title under which Illinois held
the navigable waters was:
[D]ifferent in character from that which the state holds in lands intended
for sale .... It is a title held in trust for the people of the state that they
may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interferences of
private parties.
20 1
The Illinois Central principle is characteristic of the doctrine, which
places public rights to some resources above purely local or private
concerns. In modern contexts, the principle forces full and public
consideration of a state's interests in any action adversely affecting
those traditional rights.2"' The protection encompasses the broad
196. See generally Sax, supra note 195.
197. Public trust law began narrowly as applicable to "that aspect of the public
domain below the low-water mark on the margin of the sea and the great lakes, the
waters over those lands, and the waters within rivers and streams of any consequence,"
then public parklands. Sax, supra note 195, at 556.
198. Id. at 475. The "controversy and confusion" surrounding the doctrine's mani-
festation in American law has been attributed to "the failure of many courts to distin-
guish between the government's general obligation to act for the public benefit, and the
special, and more demanding, obligation which it may have as trustee of certain public
resources." Id. at 478.
199. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
200. Sax, supra note 195, at 489-90.
201. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452.
202. Sax, supra note 195, at 531. In his more recent commentary, while still pro-
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spectrum of interests represented by the resources, preserved for a
diverse public, in light of the state's trustee relationship to them.2 °3
Since the early applications, "[c]ourts have steadily expanded the
public trust concept beyond application to submerged lands, the fore-
shore, and navigable waters to encompass injuries to parks, non-navi-
gable water, air, land, wetlands, ecological values, and water quan-
tity as well as quality. '204 The convergence of various trends evident
in the courts resulted in a "generic" formulation "to describe the
public lands as being held in trust."2 ° Trust language permeates en-
vironmental case law when courts want to impress certain resources
with principles which will protect them for the well-being of the
community. 206 By codifying federal and state trustee roles, CER-
CLA and CWA confer formal powers and obligations on govern-
ment as guardian of public natural resources, particularly in the ab-
sence of any private right of action for damages to public resources
and in the absence of standing to sue accorded the resources
themselves.20 7
B. Basis of the Public Trust
The government's trustee relationship to natural resources may be
founded in a constitution, a statute, or the common law. The public
trust may attach to land, water, or other resources, by implication or
by virtue of original dedication for specific purposes. 20 8 Grounds for
moting the doctrine, Sax characterizes it as substantive rather than "technique" as he
had in his earlier work, and admits its operation as squarely rooted in property law with
judicial standards analagous to private property rights in its application. Sax, Liberating
the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185,
188-89 (1980).
203. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 269, 316 (1980).
204. Anderson, supra note 3, at 413.
205. Wilkinson, supra note 203, at 304.
206. Nonetheless, "[t]he public trust doctrine does not exist to allow judges to act
as roving ambassadors on behalf of a 'public' consisting mainly of environmentalists.
Rather the doctrine protects the resources themselves." Id. at 315-16.
207. Granting such standing to natural resources themselves has been proposed;
see, e.g., Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Ob-
jects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
208. J. MACDONALD & J. CONWAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 97, 98 (1972).
A public trustee is on a somewhat different footing from a private trustee. The state's
quasi-sovereign power and duty to protect its natural resources holdings by regulation or
by recovery for loss is not based on legal title (which the state does not have, for exam-
ple, to its fish and wildlife), but rather on implication and analogy. Hayes & Evans,
State Recovery for Wildlife Destruction: New Life for an Old Doctrine, 2 GEo. MASON
L. REV. 13, 25 (1977). Although early cases sometimes denied recovery to a state for the
asserting the doctrine have evolved from an emphasis on property
rights to an emphasis on police power as the source of trustee au-
thority.2"9 That change in emphasis from a proprietary construct to a
sovereign function carries with it a change in the construction of du-
ties owed to the public. Under a police power or regulatory construct
"rulemaking is required, records are open, decision-making is shared,
and the courts are available because public lands business is public
business. It is the public to whom public lands managers are ulti-
mately accountable."21 0 The sovereign retains supervisory authority
even over conveyances of trust resources to private parties, and "pri-
vate property rights in the resource are 'impressed' with the public
trust, fee simple notwithstanding." '211
Legislative developments since 1970212 have incorporated new
public policy concerns regarding natural resource holdings. Those
developments fuel the contention that the public trust concept is an
value of fish killed by chemical discharges on grounds that the state lacked property
interests in free-swimming fish (Id. at 25-26), such holdings restricting states' rights to
regulatory ones appear to ignore that the regulatory authority derives from the state's
historical position as trustee. Id. at 27. See Maryland Dep't. of Natural Resources v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972); see also infra note 230 (discus-
sion of Amerada Hess).
209. Sax, supra note 195, at 484.
210. Wilkinson, supra note 203, at 304. This shift is virtually complete. The fiction
of sovereign "ownership" of wild animals, for example, is a largely discredited concept
after having exercised historical sway with the judiciary. The Supreme court had sub-
scribed to the ownership theory regarding wildlife until fairly recently. See, e.g., Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). In Toomer, the Court referred to the "technical owner-
ship" a state has of its resources and from which it derives a legal right to pursue an
action for damages as trustee for its citizens.
See also, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). Geer established long-stand-
ing precedent for that concept. The Court upheld a statute prohibiting the removal of
legally captured game birds for sale outside the state because a state's proprietary inter-
est in fish and wild game within its borders sufficed to accord the state authority to
regulate subsequent ownership of the captured wildlife. "The common ownership imports
the right to keep the property, if the sovereign so chooses, always within its jurisdiction
for every purpose." Id. at 530.
But see Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The Hughes Court expressly over-
ruled Geer. Id. at 325. Like Geer, Hughes involved a challenge under the commerce
clause to a state statute. The Court dismissed the ownership theory, eliminating any
special proprietary doctrine which sets fish and wildlife apart from other natural re-
sources over which a state exercises regulatory authority. The ownership theory is "no
more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing 'the importance to its people that a
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource'
... .Under modern analysis, the question is simply whether the State has exercised its
police power in conformity with the federal laws and constitution." Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) (quoted in Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335). However,
the Hughes Court expressly validated the legitimacy of "state concerns for conservation
and protection of wild animals." Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
211. Lazarus, supra note 190, at 655 n.157-60.
212. E.g., creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the imple-
mentation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requirements that
Environmental Impact Statements precede developments likely to impact natural re-
source holdings.
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anachronism which should be phased out of environmental law.2 13
The historical need for such a theory as the source of government
authority to restrict private activity deemed contrary to the public
interest is arguably supplanted. New bases for action that are more
responsive to current social values and to the characteristics of the
resources themselves, "from federal environmental protection stat-
utes and new state resource allocation laws to evolving common-law
principles of tort law,' 2 14 displace the need for a public trust
doctrine.2 15
Moreover, the argument continues, expansion of government over-
sight functions undercuts the early premise of the trust doctrine as
"a needed legal basis to ensure public accountability for governmen-
tal decisions that adversely affect the environment."216 Since the
1960s, Congress has increasingly imposed procedures on administra-
tive agencies charged with implementing statutes. The result is a sig-
nificant transformation of agency decisionmaking processes and ac-
countability. Courts strictly enforce public participation
requirements and make it easier for private citizens to seek judicial
review of agency decisions.21 7 Judicial scrutiny extends not only to
agency actions, but also to agency inactions. Such developments, the
argument goes, render the public trust doctrine unnecessary as a
means of preventing needless environmental degradation 18 and in-
213. However, the source of that legislative authority may require a conceptual
reformulation.
214. Lazarus, supra note 190, at 633.
215. "Since its inception, the public trust doctrine has been premised on the notion
that absent title or reserved trust authority, the government would not possess the neces-"
sary regulatory authority to protect important natural resources. This original premise
clearly is no longer valid." Id. at 675-76. In support of this contention, commentators
point to the complex permit schemes at the federal level that the government has estab-
lished to restrict the "impact of traditional private property rights on the quality and
quantity of essential natural resources, such as air, minerals, certain animal species, sur-
face and subsurface water supplies, and in turn on public health and welfare." Id. at 676
(citing as examples the Clean Air Act "zoning" of the country into areas of different
levels of air quality and the regulation of sources of air pollution, as well as the Clean
Water Act which prohibits the discharge of any substance into waters of the United
States without a permit from the government). State and local governments likewise ex-
ercise extensive regulatory (police power) authority, "even for land, undoubtedly the
most central object of private property rights". Id. at 679.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 682.
218. "[E]arly [environmental] statutes addressed future harms. . . . [But b]y the
1970s Congress and State legislatures had enacted sweeping precautionary and environ-
mental protection measures. The common law has been reduced to providing interim
relief, pending likely regulation." Anderson, supra note 3, at 421. Increased public inter-
est in environmental issues ensures greater governmental involvement in decisions involv-
consistent with emerging legal alternatives. The doctrine's roots are
in a past devoid of watchdog agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Actually; "[m]ost commentators agree that the common law is a
seriously flawed system for providing general environmental redress"
because it is "too narrow to deal comprehensively with the commu-
nity-wide disruptions typical of environmental degradation."2 19 Fur-
thermore, current statutory causes of action, like those available
under CERCLA, provide easier routes to damages recoveries
through the imposition of strict, joint and several liability, the relax-
ation of evidentiary barriers, and the expanded definition of PRP's.
Such observations are persuasive, but only when the government is
(or ought to be) the plaintiff. Exclusive reliance on statutory reme-
dies is only reassuring if the codified authority and obligations are at
least as comprehensive as at common law.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the persistence of trust lan-
guage belies the demise of the concept in environmental law,
whether one looks at case law or at the very legislation which critics
assert supplants the trust notion. These signs suggest instead an
evolution of the doctrine from its narrow origins to a more expansive
construct, the latter infused inevitably with a long tradition of judi-
cial recognition and enforcement. Enacted law is a process, as are
the emerging environmental problems it must address, such as acid
rain, new toxic wastes, and new ways in which old hazards are infil-
trating and injuring natural resources. Until the law is comprehen-
sive in its treatment of environmental problems, the availability of a
theory impressed with precedent is a valuable tool for injunctive re-
lief or damages, inasmuch as hazardous substances often create par-
ticularly pressing needs for immediate action.
Furthermore, as government itself becomes increasingly vulnerable
to liability for natural resource damages, flexible theories of recovery
serve a legitimate public interest. Surely a common law public trust
doctrine refined in scope and application, perhaps by the very stat-
utes some argue ought to displace it, remains a viable and valuable
ing natural resources, which helps offset the often misplaced reliance on the free market
premise that a private decisionmaker acting in that individual's best interest will also be
acting in society's best interest (the cost-benefit versus internalization assessments).
The argument against retention of a public trust concept asserts that the doctrine has
eroded along with traditional concepts of absolute private property rights in resources.
Lazarus, supra note 190, at 701. Advocates of resisting "the tremendous mystical and
romantic appeal" of the doctrine, point to recent judicial opinions to bolster their conten-
tion that "any special legal status the trust rationale has enjoyed in the past is waning."
Id. at 701, 710, 713 n.470. These advocates want natural resources law to become "prop-
erly fused with and into modern notions of tort and property law." Id. at 715. They view
this process as requiring a "strategic retreat from the public trust doctrine." Id. at 710.
219. Anderson, supra note 3, at 421 & n.70.
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source of procedural and substantive rights as an alternative theory
available to trustees and citizens alike. Its incorporation, even if met-
aphorically, into environmental legislation suggests that the concept
retains power to force accountability and action.
C. Evolution of Trust Concept Uses
Judicial application of the public trust doctrine has changed over
time, paralleling the evolution of public policy concerning natural
resources. The original emphasis recognized rights in government,
particularly the states, to act on behalf of citizens to manage public
holdings. Since the 1970s, the emphasis has been less on upholding
government actions than on constraining them.220
Three periods of change have molded the public trust doctrine in
the United States. First, in the 19th century, while the public trust
doctrine still applied primarily to navigable waters,
[t]he inland public lands and resources were used as inducements to subsi-
dize the opening of the West. Ranchers were allowed to graze their stock on
the open public domain at no cost .... Free land was made available to
settlers .... Timberlands were available for homesteading and through
railroad land grants. Public minerals, water and wildlife were readily avail-
able to the first takers .... [T]he General Land Office existed almost ex-
clusively to divest the United States of land and resources-not to manage
them.22'
The traditional trust doctrine "became as much a legal basis for eco-
nomic expansion as for resource protection."22
Then, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress be-
gan to move toward a policy of reserving land rather than divesting
its holdings:
Some land was set aside from development to be held for future genera-
tions. . . .[R]ange and timber resources were more actively managed on a
220. That is,
the direct or indirect use of the public trust doctrine to limit federal power and
to justify rights of the public against the government .... Specific statutory
authority to sue for damages to natural resources has replaced the need to rely
exclusively upon common law theories of recovery, but the latter have not been
eliminated as alternative causes of action. The heart of the public trust doc-
trine, however it may be articulated, is that it imposes limits and obligations on
governments.
Wilkinson, supra note 203, at 284 & n.60.
221. Id. at 294-96 (footnotes omitted).
222. Lazarus, supra note 190, at 641. This trend manifested itself in urban envi-
ronments as well. Examples include state court rulings supporting use of subsurfaces for
city infrastructures such as sewer and gas lines, and further use of the trust concept in its
historical sovereignty garb to allow growing cities like Los Angeles to control water to
meet the needs of the inhabitants. Id.
sustained-yield basis. Fuel minerals were. . . placed under a leasing system
[in 1920]. . . . [These early] statutes . . . although rudimentary compared
with modern legislation . . . established general responsibilities that guided
public lands agencies until well after World War 1I.223
Finally, during the 1960s and 1970s, the pressures on natural re-
sources became increasingly apparent. In response, Congress adopted
a third approach to management strategy. The National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA) 24 of 1970 inaugurated a series of legis-
lative actions to protect the environment, from wilderness legislation
to coal leasing. The new environmental legislation codified mecha-
nisms such as long-range planning, citizen involvement, and interdis-
ciplinary coordination. This evidence substantiates the contention
that "Congress has turned four-square from a policy of disposition to
a policy of retention. '225 The notion of a public trust in natural re-
sources carries a duty "to protect the peoples' common heritage" in
them, not merely the poWer "to use public property for public pur-
poses. '2 26 Throughout the 1980s, courts continued to validate the af-
firmative duty incumbent on sovereign trustees, and displayed an un-
willingness to discard the public trust doctrine despite abandonment
of the theory that it is founded in ownership of the public natural
resources.
227
Thus, public policy began with the idea that federal natural re-
sources should be granted to the states for growth and expansion or
sold to enhance the public treasury. The trust concept was invoked to
validate government disposition of natural resource holdings which it
did not "own. '22s As tentative protection and management policies
223. Wilkinson, supra note 203, at 296.
224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
225. Wilkinson, supra note 203, at 297.
226. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3rd 419, 434-35, 638
P.2d 709, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356-57, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), quoted in
McIntyre, Tortfeasor Liability for Disaster Response Costs: Accounting for the True
Cost of Accidents, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1001, 1027 n.151 (1987).
227. States and the federal government have been found to have "the right and the
duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources." In re
Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980), quoted in McIntyre, supra
note 227, at 1027.
The District of Columbia (D.C.) asserted an unusual application of the public trust
doctrine as a common law theory of recovery for cleanup costs following a plane crash in
the Potomac River. District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). The wreck had disrupted navigation and damaged a bridge. The government
asserted that the defendant, Air Florida, had a duty of care not to interfere with D.C.
exercising its public trustee obligation "to keep the Potomac River free from impedi-
ments to navigation and from pollution and other impurities." McIntyre, supra note 227,
at 1028. By negligently causing the plane to crash into the river, Air Florida breached its
noninterference duty. "Although ruling in favor of defendant on other grounds, the court
stressed that it did not reject plaintiff's public trust theory of recover. Id. at 1028-29.
228. Parens patriae ("parent of the country") is a second common law theory
available to states. In the United States, the theory has been construed to permit the
state to assert quasi-sovereign interests, such as environmental interests, in a suit for
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emerged, the trust concept was invoked to assert governmental regu-
latory authority over the holdings it retained. Finally, modern public
policy is embodied in the statutory premise that "public resources
are to be nurtured and preserved; that the public is to play a mea-
sured but significant role in decision making; and that the lands and
resources are to be managed on a sustained-yield basis for future
generations." 229
damages, as long as the interests asserted are separate and independent of any interest
individual citizens of the state may have a right to assert. Hayes & Evans, supra note
209, at 28.
For example, the court in Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (1973), held
that the state was the proper plaintiff to bring an action for additional values lost, beyond
those claimed by clamdiggers for their lost profits, when the open-access portions of a
shellfish resource were destroyed by an oil spill. The claims were independent of those
asserted by private citizens. The court held that the state properly asserted its claim
under the parens patriae theory, bringing action on its own behalf rather than on behalf
of particular citizens. The court concluded that case law
establish[es] that the right of a State to sue as parens patriae is not limited to
suits to protect only its proprietary interests; a State also may maintain an
action parens patriae on behalf of its citizens to protect its so-called "quasi-
sovereign" interests. . . . A quasi-sovereign interest must be an interest of the
State "independent of and behind the titles of its citizens" . . . that is, ...
the State "must show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery
for the benefit of individuals who are the real parties in interest."
Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1099-100 (quoting Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396
(1938)). Although the court adopted the language of the state's ownership interest in
resources it also asserted the right of states to sue under the theory for non-proprietary
interests. In the court's view, parens patriae will support the maintenance of a suit for
damages brought by states for natural resource damages since the proprietary interest
was not a limiting factor in the decision. Although the Tamano court viewed Supreme
Court decisions as implying that a suit parens patriae will support an action for damages
as well as injunctive relief, barring some substantive impediment, that is not a settled
issue. Id., 357 F. Supp. at 1101. "Perhaps for this reason, about sixty percent of the
states have authorized actions for money damages for injury to fish and wildlife." Ander-
son, supra note 3, at 413, referencing Halter & Thomas, supra note 4, at 10.
Parens patriae and public trust concepts are not interchangeable. An illustration of the
distinction is that a state might assert its standing to sue as parens patriae rather than as
trustee, but would be able to assert the parens patriae right of standing because of its
traditional role as "trustee" of that infringed interest. "Thus, the public trust doctrine is
a much broader and more pervasive concept, and, although it must serve as a basis for a
parens patriae action for wildlife recovery, the reverse is not true, for an action as trustee
can be maintained without reference to parens patriae." Hayes & Evans, supra note 208,
at 28. Furthermore, the trust doctrine has been used as a basis for affirmative regulation,
whereas parens patriae, a concept primarily of judicial standing, probably could not be
so used. Id.
229. Wilkinson, supra note 203, at 299. The U.S. Forest Service recently provided
further evidence of this trend. In the wake of complaints from Western forest supervisors
that "current policies force them to sacrifice the environment to meet unrealistic harvest
levels," and scientific challenges to lumber industry assertions that "cutting old trees and
planting new ones eases the so-called greenhouse effect", and efforts to reduce the clear-
cutting logging method, the Forest Service announced it will "fundamentally change
Judicial opinions have paralleled this evolution. 230 The trust con-
cept appears in modern common law as imposing an affirmative duty
to recover for damaged natural resources. 31 The persistent judicial
allusion to the trust concept arises even in cases brought under stat-
utes. The analogy is explicit in Colocotroni, where the district court
cast the recovery in terms of "reimbursing" the trust for "the dimi-
nution attributable to the wrongdoers. ' ' 32 Environmental legislation
management policies for national forests in California." L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1990, at A3.
"While the national forests . . . must continue to . . [produce] natural resources we
consume . . . we will strive for better balance in our program." Plans include aug-
menting designated wilderness area. Id.
En route toward the modern view of the public trust, government increasingly used ihe
doctrine to expand its "sovereign authority over natural resources covered by the doc-
trine." Lazarus, supra note 190, at 655. "For example, several courts have held that the
doctrine confers standing on the government to seek injunctive relief to prevent threats to
trust resources, or when the harm has already been done, to sue for monetary relief." Id.
at 656, n.161, n.162. CERCLA codifies such authority.
230. Common law causes of action for natural resource damages recovery are not
precluded by hazardous substance legislation. Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F.
Supp 1060 (D. Md. 1972) demonstrates how the public trust doctrine and environmental
legislation are interrelated. The Amerada Hess court recognized the state's right to re-
cover the value of fish and wildlife wrongfully destroyed due to an oil spill in Baltimore
Harbor, as an action to compensate an injured trust corpus. The court rejected the de-
fendants' argument that the state as a "mere trustee" of natural resources lacked a pro-
prietary interest in the resources on which it could found a suit, and that by not enacting
any legislation for statutory damages actions under its regulatory authority, the state had
no standing to sue. The court held that the state had the right to bring a common law
suit on behalf of its citizens because it "would violate common sense" to prohibit a state
from pursuing an action at common law to achieve a purpose it could concededly accom-
plish by legislation: "[I]f a State. . . has the power to legislate regarding a given subject
matter, does it not follow that the state. . . has the inherent power to protect the public
welfare by bringing common law suits which seek to attain the same result as that which
legislation would seek to accomplish?" Id. at 1066-67. In addition, "[t]he conclusion
seems inescapable to this Court, that if the State is deemed to be the trustee of the
waters, then, as trustee the State must be empowered to bring suit to protect the corpus
of the trust . . . for the beneficiaries of the trust." Id. at 1067.
231. The New Jersey Superior Court, shortly after the Amerada Hess decision,
cast a state's parens patriae right to sue in terms of its trustee status. The court's views
on the trustee issue are revealing, even though the original holding was ultimately re-
versed. State Dep't of Envtl Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 125 N.J.
Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (1973), af/'d, 133 N.J. Super. 375, 336 A.2d 750, cert. granted,
68 N.J. 161, 343 A.2d 449 (1975), rev'd, 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976). The state
sought the value of fish killed when an electric power company caused a drop in tempera-
ture in a creek by suddenly shutting down its condensers which were cooled by water
from a canal flowing into the creek. The defendants contended that the state lacked
proprietary interest in the fish killed, therefore an action for damages was precluded. The
court rejected the argument that the State's remedy was limited to injunctive relief to
protect the trust corpus. "The court agrees with the reasoning expressed in Maryland v,
Amerada Hess. . . . The State has not only the right but also the affirmative fiduciary
obligation to ensure that the rights of the public to a viable marine environment are
protected, and to seek compensation for any diminution in that trust corpus." Id. at 674
(emphasis added). It "would be unreasonable and injudicious to impose the fiduciary
duties of a trustee upon the State while withholding the ability to have the corpus reim-
bursed for a diminution attributable to a wrongdoer." Id. at 673-74.
232. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1344 n.42 (D.P.R.
1978), afi'd, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
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affirms both trustee authority and trustee obligations vis-a-vis natu-
ral resources, including provisions for citizen intervention in legal ac-
tions affecting decisions involving public holdings.
V. TRUSTEE LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGES
For a public trust doctrine to function meaningfully as a modern
tool for "a comprehensive legal approach to resource management
problems, 23 3 one commentator identified three criteria which the
doctrine must possess: "It must contain some concept of a legal right
in the general public; it must be enforceable against the government;
and it must be capable of an interpretation consistent with contem-
porary concerns for environmental quality."2 34 The doctrine's en-
forceability against the government became important as its applica-
tions shifted from use as a tool primarily in the exercise of
government power to one available as a check on government actions
as well. It was invoked by citizens and applied by courts "to impose
enforceable restrictions on the authority of the sovereign to act in a
manner potentially harmful to the trust resource."2 5 Using the doc-
trine, courts questioned the validity of agency decisions that compro-
mised trust resources. In particular, courts scrutinized agency deci-
sions which limited public access to those resources, using techniques
such as narrow readings of legislative delegation of authority over
the resources.23 6
When the issue is natural resource injury for which the govern-
ment trustee is responsible, a logical extension of the theory is to use
trustee obligations as the basis for establishing liability to forcing
restoration. Citizens may have a right to bring an action under the
public trust theory. As some commentators contend,
From the declaration of a common-law right on the part of the state to sue
on behalf of its citizens, it can logically be argued that if there is any au-
thority in the state allowing a suit on behalf of the public, any citizen can
233. Sax, supra note 195, at 474.
234. Id.
235. Lazarus, supra note 190, at 650.
236. Advocates of the doctrine suggest:
[A] court [could] begin with a presumption that the public interest is best
served by preserving to the general public the beach and wildlife values
threatened [for example] by oil and gas operations. The utilization of that pre-
sumption would thrust upon the proponents of a different allocation the burden
of proof and persuasion. Such a shifting of burden would be a court's contribu-
tion to the equalization of political power ....
Sax, supra note 195, at 546 n.228.
sue to enforce such a right.23 7
All legislation charging government officials with administering
the public interest confers broad trustee-like status. Yet, routine ad-
ministration of public natural resources may involve no imposition of
special fiduciary duties.238 In contrast, use of the trust concept in the
CERCLA legislation creates far-reaching authority for both federal
and state governments: CERCLA 'calls the officials "trustees;" the
statute imposes affirmative duties; government standing to sue to
protect the trust corpus is explicit (and exclusive); and procedures
for maximizing recoveries are mandated. In such circumstances,
"the trustee is not an ordinary government official; a trust is not a
routine management tool."'239 Even so, the allocation of trust duties
under CERCLA creates an interrelationship and potential overlap
among states, or between a state and the federal government, in a
given recovery action. The DOI rules designate either or both as
having standing to conduct damage assessments and to initiate ac-
tions, and merely advocate coordination of efforts among the trustee
agencies, with a "lead official" to be selected based on the jurisdic-
tion (federal or state) where the resource is located.2 40 Under CER-
CLA, PRP liability is to both the affected state government and the
federal government. How the trust "reimbursement" should be allo-
cated and administered is not clear.
A modern public trustee, therefore, assumes dual obligations.
First, such a trustee is the custodian of natural resources to be man-
aged, protected, and restored when damaged. Second, the trustee is
accountable as a responsible party should the trustee be the cause of
harms to the resources. The implications of trustee liability raise
practical and conceptual questions when the role is codified, as in
CERCLA. A sampling of potential problems includes the overlap of
federal and state trustee obligations;24' the rights of citizens to force
action by trustees through intervention in civil actions for damages;
and the mechanisms for satisfying potential judgments against gov-
ernment entities as PRP's for natural resource damages.
237. J. MACDONALD & J. CONWAY, supra note 208, at 124.
238. Anderson, supra note 3, at 414.
239. Id.
240. 43 C.F.R. § 11.32(a)(1) (1989).
241. Federal and state trustee authority differs historically. The public trust doc-
trine at common law attached to state authority over specific kinds of public natural
resources. See generally Lazarus, supra note 190. The federal government's public trust
authority derives from "organic legislation for parks, forests, and public lands." Ander-
son, supra note 3, at 413. The existence of federal government trust duties is assertedly
entirely dependent on statute. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp 443, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that any federal trust duties must be statutorily conferred); see
also Wilkinson, supra note 203, at 290-91. However, case law does not provide "a defini-
tive resolution of these public trust issues." Id. at 293.
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A. Private Rights of Action
Public trustees may be negligent or may mismanage the duties
they owe to the natural resource holdings on behalf of the public.
These failings, including failure to adequately pursue compensation
for injury, ought to be actionable against the government. CERCLA
provides that government affiliation with the offending hazardous
substances or release incident renders the government amenable to
suit. Nonetheless, it is unclear how such a process will work despite
the explicit inclusion of government as a PRP, because only public
trustees are empowered to bring suit for public natural resource
damages under the Act.
Because the concept of a trustee of natural resources is specifically legis-
lated by Superfund, with the broad implied fiduciary obligations that ac-
company the trust relationship as it exists throughout Anglo-American law,
one may ask whether the trustee owes obligations toward natural re-
sources-the corpus of the trust-that are not spelled out in Superfund.
Like bank officials who are liable to beneficiaries for their mishandling of
trust funds, a natural resource trustee's failure to perform fiduciary duties
toward resources may be actionable at the instance of private citizens, the
beneficiaries of the trust. Arguably, section 310 of Superfund (the citizen's
suit provision) affords a basis for such action.
2 2
The citizen suit provision allows "any person" to "commence a
civil action on his own behalf" against the President or any other
U.S. officer for "alleged . . . failure . . . to perform any act or
duty" under the chapter,24 3 with relief to include "any civil penalty
for the violation. 244 Private parties are not empowered by CERCLA
to seek monetary recoveries against the government or any other
PRP for public natural resource damages. Nonetheless, the citizen
suit provision, coupled with the codified trustee status of government
(undiminished presumably by any simultaneous PRP designation),
might be imaginatively applied to force actions for restoration of re-
sources injured or destroyed by hazardous substance releases.
1. Intervention
CERCLA does not authorize private parties to seek damages di-
rectly for public natural resources injuries.2 4 The government (state
242. Anderson, supra note 3, at 414.
243. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659(a) (West Supp. 1989).
244. Id. § 9659(c).
245. Certain federal causes of action are preempted by environmental legislation.
For example, "The Supreme Court readily rejected a claim for private damages in Sea
Clammers [Middlesex County Sewage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453
U.S. 1 (1981)] because 'the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollu-
or federal), "acting as trustee," is solely empowered to seek such
recoveries. However, if citizens or environmental groups perceive in-
adequacies in the government's handling of the process, they may
intervene in the government's suit. 46 In re Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor24 provides an illustration of that intervention right.
In that case, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), also a party
in the Colorado and Ohio cases, moved to intervene in the federal
and state governments' ("the sovereigns' ") CERCLA action against
harbor polluters. The NWF asserted that the proposed consent de-
cree between the sovereigns and defendant AVX Corporation pro-
vided inadequate damages to compensate for the effects of defend-
ant's release of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contaminants into
the harbor. The estimated damages exceeded $50 million; the gov-
ernment negotiated a settlement proposal with the defendant in the
amount of $2 million.
248
The case began in 1983 when the United States and the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts brought an action as natural resources
trustees seeking recovery for damages to New Bedford Harbor. The
sovereigns claimed damages for the diminished value of the re-
sources and their lost use over time.2 49 By 1989, the sovereigns and
AVX had negotiated a Partial Consent Decree to settle AVX's lia-
bility for its role as owner and operator of the source of the PCB's, a
manufacturing plant adjacent to the harbor. The sovereigns had es-
tion is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA .. .
Conner v. Aerovox, Inc., 730 F.2d 835 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050
(1985) (quoting Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22). Conner was an early phase of the
Acushnet litigation discussed below.
The rights of citizens to pursue private causes of action for their own property and
health damages from hazardous substance releases are beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. They are preserved in the language of CERCLA: tort actions in trespass, nuisance,
negligence, etc. remain available to injured parties who can establish the respective ele-
ments. In addition, CERCLA legislation authorizes citizen suits for recovery of some
response and cleanup costs from the responsible private parties or against Superfund
itself. Injunctive relief is also available to private citizens. Many citizen actions against
private corporations have resulted in settlements. See L. JORGENSON & J. KImEL, ENVI-
RONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS: CONFRONTING THE CORPORATION (BNA Special Report,
1988). The citizen suit provisions under CERCLA appear at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659.
246. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9659(h), 9613(i) (West Supp. 1989); see also FED. R. CIv. P.
24.
247. 712 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Mass. 1989). Opinions from Feb. 17, 1989 (712 F.
Supp. 994), Mar. 28, 1989 (712 F. Supp. 1010), and Apr. 27, 1989 (712 F. Supp. 1019)
are reported. The Acushnet case is interesting, also, in that it preceded the rulings in
Ohio and Colorado by just three months and petitioners successfully raised similar objec-
tions to the measure of damages issues settled in the latter cases.
248. Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1031.
249. "[T]he United States and the Commonwealth are suing, albeit under a stat-
ute, for injury to the property over which they hold trusteeship ... for the value of the
natural resources damages that are forever lost, the value of the lost use of such re-
sources over time and the costs of assessing how much is lost forever or how much lost
use there has been over time ('natural resource damages') .... " Acushnet, 712 F.
Supp. 994, 1000 (D. Mass. 1989).
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sentially applied the DOI "lesser of" rule in negotiating the settle-
ment. 250 NWF sought to intervene, objecting to the proposed settle-
ment on the grounds, among others, that the measure of damages
was inappropriate. NWF asserted that the "correct measure . . . is
. . . the cost of restoration or replacement of the natural resources,
or failing that, of the acquisition of equivalent resources, plus the
lost use value,"'25x the same arguments with which NWF prevailed in
Ohio. The Acushnet court held that the sovereigns no longer repre-
sented NWF interests: "[T]he substantial divergence of views on the
proper measure of damages . . . necessarily renders the formers'
representation of the latter inadequate. ' 252 The court rejected the
sovereigns' claim that intervention was inappropriate because their
ultimate goal and that of NWF were the same, with only the means
differing.253 The court held that the "substantial difference in possi-
ble recoveries under the . . . [divergent] theories of damages"
[would] profoundly affect the ultimate quality of the harbor,2 54 so
that NWF intervention was justified. 55
Under the Acushnet precedent, public trustees are accountable for
their proposed settlements for natural resource damages in CER-
CLA actions. Their conduct of the process is open to challenge by
the public. The case establishes that citizens who are successful in
demonstrating a trustee's inadequate representation of cognizable in-
terests may intervene and block the finalization of natural resource
damages settlements which the government has negotiated with re-
sponsible parties.
250. Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1024. Although the DOI natural resource damage
assessment rules are not expressly named in the opinion, the court's analysis of the com-
peting measurements and standards describes the contested "lesser of" rule. Id. n.7; see
infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
251. Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1024.
252. Id. NFW sought "to represent the interests of its members who live in the
New Bedford Harbor area." Id. at 1022.
253. Id. at 1024.
254. Id.
255. Specifically, the NWF gained the right to brief and argue four categories of
issues: (1) "[T]he legal requirements applicable to any proposed consent decree"; (2)
"the appropriate measure of natural resources damages under CERCLA"; (3) "the legal
requirements for cleanup under CERCLA"; and (4) other issues allowed by the court.
Id. at 1023. Moreover, NWF had the explicit right to "take an appeal from a judgment
it views as adverse" on the other items. Id.
2. Contribution
CERCLA explicitly includes states in the definitions of PRP and
"person. ' '21> The contribution provision of the statute permits "[a]ny
person . . . [to] seek contribution from any other person who is lia-
ble or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title. 257
SARA explicitly incorporated a right to contribution 218 and left
"[t]he substantive law of contribution under CERCLA . . . to the
federal courts to define. '25 9 Thus, all responsible parties may be re-
quired to share in damages. The expansion of liability under CER-
CLA made it likely that other responsible parties would seek to hold
government trustees responsible parties accountable just like
themselves.26 °
When the party seeking contribution is a private party and the
party from whom contribution is sought is a state, implementation of
liability apportionment is complicated by issues of sovereign immu-
nity. A recent Supreme Court decision, Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas,26' addressed the matter of contribution under CERCLA in
such instances. The issues in Union Gas were whether CERCLA
permits the pursuit of monetary damages against a state in federal
court and, if so, whether the creation of such a cause of action is
within congressional authority. Although the case treats only recov-
ery of clean-up costs, the contribution provision in the statute applies
to all of the liability provisions in the section, where the natural re-
source damages provisions are also found.26 2 The Union Gas Court
did not limit its holding to actions under the cleanup cost provisions
alone.26 3
256. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (West Supp. 1989).
257. Id. § 9613(0(1).
258. Id. § 9613(f).
259. Garber, supra note 39, at 387.
260. Under pre-amendment CERCLA, "contribution either was inferred from the
language of the statute or was found necessary to protect a ... set of federal interests
underlying the statute." Id. at 371. At common law, "[t]he doctrine of contribution al-
lows a settlor who has paid all or a portion of a judgment to seek contribution from other
jointly and severally liable parties .... [A] settlement by the plaintiff with one or more
joint tortfeasors does not release the settling defendants from contribution . . . [there-
fore] the common law rule discourages the settlement of cases because the defendant
settlor remains potentially liable for contribution." Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1024 n.9.
261. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
262. 42 U.S.C.A. 9607(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1989).
263.
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly holds the States liable for damages
in private suits. The inclusion of States, apparently for all purposes within the
definition of "person" reinforced by the language of the limitation that assumes
state liability equivalent to the liability of private individuals, leaves no fair
doubt that States are liable to private persons for money damages.
109 S. Ct. at 2296 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Some observers view the
extension of statutory liability under CERCLA as settled: "The courts and EPA today
maintain that [PRP's] are strictly, jointly and severally liable for cleanup or its costs.
[VOL 27: 407, 1990] Natural Resource Damages
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Pennsylvania had acquired from the owners of a coal gasification
plant an easement to perform flood-control work along a creek.
While excavating, the state struck a coal tar deposit, a by-product of
the plant operations. The tar seeped into the creek, necessitating
clean-up of the hazardous substance, a task performed jointly by the
state and federal governments. The site was Superfund's first pro-
ject. 64 The state received $720,000 from the federal government as
compensation for its clean-up costs. The federal government then
sued Union Gas to recoup the expenditure. Union Gas asserted that
Pennsylvania fell within the "owner or operator" definition of liable
parties under CERCLA and had caused or contributed to the release
of tar into the creek. On this theory, Union Gas filed a third-party
complaint against Pennsylvania to establish the state's responsibility
for at least part of the costs. 265 The Court of Appeals held that
states are liable for monetary damages and that Congress has the
power to establish such liability when legislating under the com-
merce clause.26 6
The Supreme Court affirmed these holdings in its plurality opin-
ion. The Court recognized the power of Congress to override the
eleventh amendment grant of sovereign immunity to the States when
acting under its fourteenth amendment powers and when it makes
"its intent to do so 'unmistakably clear'." The SARA amendment
provides this clarity by defining liable parties to include govern-
ments.267 Consequently, the Court concluded that CERCLA "clearly
This liability applies as clearly to natural resource cleanup, restoration, and damages as
it does to site and spill cleanup on private property." Anderson, supra note 3, at 427.
264. 109 S. Ct. at 2276.
265. Id. at 2277.
266. The District Court initially dismissed the complaint and the Appeals Court
affirmed, "accepting Pennsylvania's claim that its Eleventh Amendment immunity barred
the suit . . . [because the courts found] no clear expression of congressional intent to
hold States liable in monetary damages under CERCLA." Id. However, SARA was en-
acted while Union Gas' petition for certiorari was pending, and the SARA amendments
incorporated explicit contribution language into CERCLA. On remand, the Appeals
Court upheld state liability for monetary damages under the amended statute. Id.
267. Id. The Court found additional support for its holding that sovereign immu-
nity will not insulate governments from liability for damages under CERCLA in the
statutory language which "unequivocally" expresses the Federal Government's waiver of
its own sovereign immunity. Id. at 2279; 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
The circumstances of this case did not qualify Pennsylvania to take advantage of an
"exclusion" category provided by the statute. The Court relied on both the text of the
statute and premise that the United States would need no statutory grounds to sue a
state as grounds to reject Pennsylvania's claim that any liability of a state under the
statute would be solely to the United States, not to private citizens. "[L]awsuits [may
be] brought by the United States against a State ... just like 'any non-governmental
entity.'" Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279. If the Act's intent had been to limit states'
permits suits for money damages against States in federal court,"26 8
and the commerce clause supplies the waiver of states' immunity
from suit for damages in such a case.269
Problems of environmental harm are often "not susceptible of a
local solution '270 and "we often must look to the Federal Govern-
ment for environmental solution. Often those solutions, to be satis-
factory, must include a cause of action for money damages. 2 171 Con-
gress' solution in CERCLA was a sweeping one intended to hold
"everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste con-
tamination" 272 liable for contribution to rectify the injury. The plu-
rality characterized Union Gas as "brilliantly" illuminating273 the
reasons "why the space carved out for federal legislation under the
commerce power must include the power to hold States financially
accountable not only to the Federal Government, but to private citi-
zens as well. 12 74 The precedent is set for the argument that govern-
ment trustees, as responsible parties under CERCLA, may be held
liable for their share of monetary damages, and that they may be
sued in federal court for contribution.
B. Implications of Trustee Liability for Restoration Costs
Union Gas confirms the principle that trustees are liable to private
parties for monetary recoveries in actions brought by co-PRP's under
CERCLA for hazardous substance remedial costs. Whether this
amenability to suit for contribution will be upheld in an action for
natural resources damages beyond cleanup and remedial costs re-
mains to be tested. Similarly, direct action against a responsible
trustee, in that capacity, for natural resource damages awaits its day
in court.
If the CERCLA liability articulated in Union Gas is upheld as
applicable to natural resource damages as well as clean-up costs, it
liability as owing solely to the federal government, there would have been no need to
legislate specially to establish that cause of action. Id.
268. 109 S. Ct. at 2280-81.
269. Congress, exercising its power under the commerce clause, "has the authority
to override States' immunity." Id. at 2284. States are deemed to have consented to be
held liable under congressional enactments when they ratified the commerce clause. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2285.
Because Congress has decided that the federal interest in protecting the envi-
ronment outweighs any countervailing interest in not subjecting States to the
possible award of monetary damages in federal court, and because the "judicial
power" of the United States plainly extends to such suits ...we may not
disregard [Congress'] express decision to subject the States to liability under
federal law.
Id. at 2289 (Stevens, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 2285.
273. Id. at 2284.
274. Id. at 2285.
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seems inevitable that governmental agencies will be named as re-
sponsible parties to share the liability for the huge damage awards
authorized under the statute. The "deep pocket" phenomenon is as
likely to operate in environmental litigation as in any tort litigation,
and state or federal government entities will surely qualify whenever
the PRP connection can be established. As litigation involving gov-
ernmental PRP's increases, a number of issues may be anticipated.
1. Conflicts of Interest
A trustee empowered to investigate and pursue restoration of dam-
aged trust resources, favored with a rebuttable presumption of accu-
rate damages assessment under codified procedures, encounters an
interesting conflict of interest when that same trustee is a potentially
or actually liable party. The goal of restoring the environment under
such circumstances risks being compromised. The Ohio decision up-
held the option of delegating assessments to PRP's themselves . 7 5
The court perceived no problem because of the required trustee over-
sight of such activity. Yet the opinion does not address how reassur-
ances might be sustained when the PRP is the trustee itself and has
an obvious incentive to undervalue the loss or to apportion liability to
minimize its own contribution to the very damages being assessed.
In these circumstances, the assessment process becomes suspect,
and the diligence (or at least neutrality) of trustee oversight is com-
promised. When a state is a PRP, and when the federal and state
jurisdictions in the resource trusteeship overlap, perhaps the federal
government under a supremacy theory could act as damage assessor
for the recovery action. Such an arrangement would alleviate the
state's conflict of interest when it is a PRP. Yet, in this scenario,
given the broad PRP definition under the statute, a nexus sufficient
to give the federal government "standing" over the damaged re-
sources is likely to confer PRP status on the federal government as
well as on the state. Moreover, federalism impediients may pre-
clude federal intervention over state resources in other
circumstances.
Furthermore, government trustees could be conflicted out of a re-
covery action entirely. If restoration of natural resources following
injury from hazardous substances is indeed the national policy, legis-
lation to facilitate alternative citizen suits are a prudent-even nec-
essary-alternative. Some common law right to an unpolluted envi-
275. See supra note 158, Issue (3).
ronment might be found to support citizen standing to sue under a
private attorney general theory, despite the CERCLA limitation
conferring on government trustees alone the authority to bring ac-
tions for public natural resource damages. 6 When a public trust
theory is codified, as under CERCLA, it is tempting to imply a di-
mension of citizen rights if the government itself becomes implicated
as a liable party and is unable to exercise its fiduciary duty to restore
the environment.
2. Satisfaction of Judgment Dilemmas
When monetary damages are the relief sought and awarded
against a public trustee, the source of funds to satisfy the obligation
is problematic. Whether it is appropriate to use a state equivalent of
the federal Superfund to restore lost uses or lost resources when the
state is a responsible party is questionable. Such a model is based on
a tax structure funded by industry engaged in the activity deemed
hazardous to the resources. A disproportionate burden would fall on
contributors to the fund over the rest of the citizenry if the state is
not also a contributor to the fund. The use of general tax revenues
for such purposes would transform the cost internalization model
into a loss spreading mechanism with the government (the already
injured public, more accurately) absorbing the loss. Treasuries at
both federal and state levels tend not to amass significant contin-
gency reserves for such purposes. The public rarely manifests suffi-
cient political pressure to cause natural resource concerns to prevail
over education, health, or the myriad of other pressing social needs,
not the least of which is the urgent need to clean up hazardous sites,
a process distinguishable from the natural resource damages actions
under CERCLA. These considerations suggest the probability of
lower (or uncollectible) recoveries when a trustee is the liable party.
The same unsatisfactory result may be anticipated as when assess-
ments use inadequate measurement methodologies: awards that are
insufficient to restore the damaged environment.
Furthermore, if tax revenues are used to satisfy a state's liability,
"willingness to pay" could take on new meaning as the standard
measure of natural resource damages. The need to use public funds
may cause restoration to be perceived as too costly in light of other
social needs. The public may come to view degradation of natural
resources, after site cleanups and alleviation of health risks, as sim-
ply an unavoidable sacrifice of modern life. Just as the finite re-
276. For a critique of citizen suits by environmental groups, which often act in a
private attorney general capacity and often under the CWA as the cheapest and most
successful avenue to environmental damages recoveries, see Greve, Congress's Environ-
mental Buccaneers, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1989, at A16, col. 4.
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sources of Superfund itself are placed off limits for natural resource
restoration 77 in order to concentrate the funds on the more urgent
human health aspects of toxic cleanup and remedial activities at
Superfund sites, so too all losses beyond the cleanup phases may be
deemed simply too costly when the PRP's are not entities whose
profits can be tapped to satisfy the liability.
Insurance for toxic liability is an increasingly problematic area in
the private sector because of the size of awards for cleanup. This
problem is bound to increase as the natural resource damages provi-
sions of CERCLA are utilized more fully in court or in settlement
agreements and added on to cleanup awards.27a Insurance is already
difficult to obtain, and insurance companies resist the huge payouts
in court.2 79 An increase in government liability will exacerbate the
insurance crisis for that type of coverage. Moreover, a self-insurance
option would defeat the purpose of removing the drain on public
funds to cover the cost of public resource damages. The financing of
277. "SARA cut off the availability of Superfund money for natural resource res-
toration in 1986, but the statutory provisions governing Superfund remain on the books
and provide evidence of Congress' intent to require responsible parties to pay restoration
costs." Ohio v. United States Dep't. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(footnote omitted).
278. Environmental liability insurance once was not closely tied to actual liability
risks and not tailored to individual firms' safety records. Hence, premium rates did not
serve to internalize costs. However, with the increase in recent years of environmental
liability litigation, insurance companies discovered that courts were broadly construing
insurance policies and imposing significant waste-related liabilities. "Facing massive
awards to insureds who had paid low premiums, and fearing further surprises, most in-
surers have withdrawn from the environmental liability market .... New liability insur-
ance policies are rarely available and often prohibitively costly." Developments in the
Law: Toxic Waste Litigation: Natural Resources Damages, supra note 26, at 1575-76.
Without such insurance, many liable parties will be unable to absorb the costs of their
liability. See also Pendygraft & Plews, Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent
Developments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REV.
117 (1988); Note, Insurance Coverage for Superfund Liability: A Plain Meaning Ap-
proach to the Pollution Exclusion Clause, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 161 (1987).
279. The California Supreme Court recently upheld an insurer's liability for $100
million in cleanup costs relating to the leakage of chemical solvents into groundwater
near Aerojet-General Corporation's Sacramento plant. The court agreed with the in-
sured's claim that the policy covers the cost of environmental cleanups under the "dam-
ages" provision common to many general liability policies. The interpretation of damages
provisions in insurance policies "has been at issue in several multimillion-dollar cases in
California as well as high-stakes legal battles in other states." L.A. Times, August 11,
1989, at 129, col. 2. The court rejected the insurer's argument that the provision does not
apply to such "business expenses" as environmental cleanups. The insurer asserted that if
insurers are held responsible, "premiums are likely to rise and coverage may become
prohibitively expensive." Id. The issue of who pays for removing hazardous waste from
the environment is the "pivotal question"; likewise, the question may be asked, who pays
for natural resources damages uncompensated after a cleanup effort?
the government's environmental liabilities is certain to pose dilem-
mas, both practical and political, at least as significant as those fac-
ing private parties.
A final implication of trustee liability for natural resource dam-
ages relates to an alternative recovery option under CERCLA: ac-
quisition of the equivalent of damaged resources. When that option
involves acquiring land, not merely replacement organisms, its use is
intended only when restoration of a damaged site is not technically
feasible.2 80 However, the government may view that remedy as more
attractive than actual expenditure of funds to satisfy its liabilities.
Both state and federal governments hold large percentages of the
nation's physical resources. A temptation could arise to satisfy judg-
ments by depleting the total trust holdings through rededication of
uses. Several concerns attach to that option. First, no perfect substi-
tute is ever available to replace the loss of unique property. Second,
the government has eminent domain powers and could condemn
property to meet the public demand for restoration of lost services,
although doing so to meet obligations incurred by its own "wrongs"
against the environment-that is, the public trust-creates a number
of equity concerns. Finally, such a solution is finite at best, limited
by the availability of "comparable" lands and the legitimacy of con-
verting resource holdings to compensate for losses rather than restor-
ing damaged sites, the remedy contemplated by CERCLA. Yet the
option is available, and expediency could prevail over more costly
reparation options.
VI. CONCLUSION
Numerous questions remain to be addressed in the assessment of
natural resource damages, the apportionment of liability, the recov-
ery options, and remedy implementation. These issues implicate both
the success of restoration efforts and the social priorities which sus-
tain them. They assume increased complexity when the public trus-
tee is a responsible party.
The natural resource damages recovery provisions of CERCLA
have not been fully exploited. A delay in issuing damage assessment
rules and the higher priority placed on urgent and costly cleanup and
remedial activities have inhibited the routine use of the powerful tool
for protecting and restoring the environment following injury by haz-
ardous substances. That situation is changing. Government trustees
will have a rebuttable presumption of accuracy to take to court when
DOI reissues damage assessment rules to conform to congressional
intent as interpreted in the recent remand rulings. Measurement
280. 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(d)(iv) (1983).
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methodologies should improve over time to lend increasing accuracy
and comprehensiveness to assessment techniques. Values which are
difficult to monetize can be incorporated into damages claims as eco-
nomic constructs evolve to measure them. Recoveries are likely to
increase in frequency and amount.
Restoring injured natural resources to their pre-injury condition is
a motivating policy behind CERCLA. The legislation encompasses a
broad range of protected natural resources, and the sources of harm
for which liability is imposed are extensive. Financial responsibility
for restoring the environment falls on a broad category of parties
responsible for hazardous substance releases. Responsible parties are
strictly, jointly and severally liable for the damages. Judicial inter-
pretations of CERCLA provisions confirm that the process for set-
ting the amount of damages must include factors which take account
of values beyond actual uses made of the resources. The methodolo-
gies used to measure damages must favor a restoration or replace-
ment valuation, whether or not such a measure results in larger
awards than would a diminution in use measure. These decisions en-
sure that the level of damages sought will remain quite high.
The authority of federal and state trustees to pursue recovery of
damages for injury to natural resources arguably incorporates fiduci-
ary duties consistent with traditional trust concepts. These public
trustees are accountable to citizens for the responsible settlement of
damages claims. The public may challenge government action if
there is evidence of settlements which inadequately compensate for
losses. Moreover, CERCLA eliminates. governmental immunity from
suit by private parties seeking contribution from trustees who are
liable for any portion of such damages when their status as responsi-
ble parties is established under the Act's comprehensive definition.
Therefore, government trustees themselves increasingly may be held
liable for natural resource damages.
If, as has been asserted, it is the resources themselves which such
legislation aims to protect, then trustee liability should be co-exten-
sive with that of any other responsible party. The state and federal
nexus to vast holdings of water, land, wildlife, wilderness, wetlands,
parklands, and other resources, as well as government involvement
with innumerable sites and facilities as owner, operator, lessor, or
transporter of hazardous substances covered by the statute, render
governments particularly vulnerable to potentially enormous dam-
ages when things go awry and natural resources are harmed. Financ-
ing protection and restoration objectives and resolving conflicts of in-
terest inherent in the regulator and responsible party dichotomy
,loom as areas of legitimate concern worthy of anticipatory study.
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